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Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass
Corp.: Asbestos Manufacturers and
Strict Liability: Just How Strict Is It?
"Asbestos, 1 a miraculous mineral that fireproofed and insulated
American homes and buildings for generations, became the cause
of a national calamity as hundreds of thousands of people exposed
to its dusts and fibers became ill and died." 2 Victims, as well as
their families, flocked to the courts to seek compensation. Cases
began pouring into the courts twice as fast as their claims could be
settled.3 Today, approximately 30,000 asbestos claims are pending
in the judicial system, and it has been predicted that asbestos
litigation will increase by fifty percent in the next three years.4
1. See Polin, Asbestosis, 45 AM. J. PRooF oF FACrS 2d, 1, 8 (1986) (providing that asbestos
consists of several varieties of silicate minerals, all of which have certain characteristics in common).
All forms of asbestos have a high degree of thermal, electrical, and chemical resistance, and therefore
make excellent insulators. Id Due to these qualities, asbestos-bearing products were used extensively
in shipbuilding and repair, and in the construction industry. Vermeulen v. Superior Court, 204 Cal.
App. 3d 1192, 1198, 251 Cal. Rptr. 805, 808 n.6 (lst Dist. 1988) (disagreed with by Anderson v.
Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 217 Cal. App. 3d 772,266 Cal. Rptr. 204 (2nd Dist. 1990), review
gr., in part Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 790 P.2d 238, 269 Cal. Rptr. 74, (1990),
and reprinted for tracking pending review Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 227 Cal.
App. 3d 1035 (2nd Dist. 1990) superseded Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 53 Cal. 3d
987, 810 P.2d 549, 281 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1991)). Asbestos was used in the following products:
Textiles, paper, ropes, wicks, stoves, filters, floor tiles, roofing shingles, clutch facings, water pipe,
cement, fillers, felt, fireproof clothing, gaskets, battery boxes, clapboard, wallboard, fire doors, fire
curtains, and brake lining. Il Additionally, it was used for fire resistant partitions in schools, office
buildings, hospitals and ships; as thermal insulation on structural steelwork; as acoustical insulation
for walls and ceilings; as undersealing for automobiles; as insulation for air conditioning ducts, shafts,
steam lines, oil lines, and chemical lines; and used in ironing board covers, theater scenery, hot air
pipe wrapping, stove lining, table pads, handles and coatings of all sorts. Ld.
2. On the Civil Courts... the Asbestos Calamity, LA. Daily J., April 4, 1991, at 6, col. 1.
It has been estimated that 200,000 to 450,000 deaths have resulted from asbestos exposure. Hensler,
Felstiner, Selvin & Ebener, Asbestos in the Courts-The Challenge of Mass Toxic Torts, p. 1 (Rand
1985).
3. On the Civil Courts... the Asbestos Calamity, supra note 2, at 6, col. 1.
4. Labaton, The Tangled Crisis of Asbestos Litigation is Still Growing, with no Solution in
Sight, LA. Daily J., March 15, 1991, at BI, col. 1; Hensler, Er. AL., supra note 2, at 1. According
to a special committee of judges, appointed by Chief Justice Rehnquist for the sole purpose of
seeking Congress' aid in rescuing the courts from this "impending disaster," asbestos claims will
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Asbestos related claims are unique.5 Many of the individuals
affected by asbestosis and other asbestos related diseases6 were
exposed to asbestos as early as the 1930's.7 By the 1940's it was
known that exposure to asbestos fibers could cause asbestosis and
other diseases.8 However, the use of asbestos was not sharply
curtailed until the 1970's, which was when most of its harmful
health effects were discovered.9 Nonetheless, the asbestos litigation
continue to emerge in the near future at a more rapid rate than ever. Labaton, supra at BI, col. 1.
This committee has urged Congress to establish a national solution to the asbestos problem. Id.
Thousands of injured people are dying before their asbestos cases are decided. I&. Eventually, the
costs of such litigation will deplete available resources well before the thousands of remaining claims
can be heard. le. See id (suggesting that whether or not an injured plaintiff will ultimately recover
damages will not depend on the extent of injury or need, but instead on which lawyer files the claim
first).
5. See HE4sLER, Er. AL.supra note 2, at 1-2 (suggesting that asbestos litigation is a new type
of cause of action that differs from traditional personal injury suits because: (1) The injuries are
medically complex, difficult to detect, associated with multiple causes, and have an uncertain
prognosis; (2) the injuries are attributed to exposure to products that occurred several years ago; (3)
there exists a large group of plaintiffs; and (4) only a small number of producers and suppliers have
been accused of the behavior that led to the plaintiffs* injuries, and most of these defendants have
been named in nearly all suits).
6. Asbestosis is the development of hardened fibrous areas in the lung tissue between the air
spaces (alveoli) in the lung. Polin, supra note 1, at 9; Hensler, ET. AL, supra note 2 at 13-14. It
generally takes at least 10, and usually 20 or more years to develop, and is first evidenced by
shortness of breath. Polin, supra note 1, at 9. By the time asbestosis is detectable, the disease is
progressive and its effects are irreversible, even if the victim is no longer exposed to asbestos dust.
Id. Asbestosis itself is not a cancerous disease; nevertheless, exposure to asbestos is associated with
lung cancer, and mesothelioma, which is a tumor on the membrane that lines the lungs and thoracic
cavity. ld Asbestos has also been associated with the recent increases in the rate of cancer of the
esophagus, stomach, colon, larynx, and kidneys. Id Like asbestosis, the symptoms of these diseases
do not manifest themselves for at least 20 years after the first exposure to asbestos dust. Id
The disease of asbestosis has been recognized since 1924. Id at 10. In the 1940"s it started to
become obvious that exposure to asbestos fibers could cause asbestosis and several other cancers. Id
However, asbestos use was not sharply curtailed until the 1970's, when most of its harmful health
effects were discovered. The Wall Street Journal, Oct. 22,1991, at A3, col. 1. See generally, Hensler,
Er. AL, supra note 2, at 1-5 (detailing the history and effects of asbestos). See id at 13 (stating that
although inhalation of asbestos fibers can cause asbestosis and other diseases, every person who is
exposed to asbestos does not necessarily develop one of the diseases associated with it).
7. Beshada v. Johns-Manvile Prod. Corp., 90 NJ. 191,196,447 A.2d 539,542 (1982). But
see Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 97 NJ. 429, 455, 479 A.2d 374, 387-88 (1984) (directly limiting
Beshada to its facts). Some commentators admit that as far back as 1924 it has been known that
exposure to asbestos caused asbestosis and other diseases. Polin, supra note 1, at 10; Hensler, H?. AL.,
supra note 2, at 1.
8. Polin, supra note 1, at 10-11.
9. Rosewicz, Appeals Panel Overturns Ban on Asbestos: Court Reverses EPA Rules Ending
Renaining Uses of Carcinogen by 1987, Wall St. J., Oct. 22, 1991, at A3, col. 1.
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has arisen only recently because of the nature of the diseases."°
There usually is a long latency period, approximately 20 years,
between the time of exposure to asbestos and the manifestation of
the symptoms of asbestosis and other asbestos related diseases."
Recently, courts have struggled with determining whether a
manufacturer of asbestos and asbestos products should be liable in
tort to an injured person or worker for failure to warn of the
product's health-related risks.12 One of the central issues which
arises in asbestos litigation is whether manufacturers should be
permitted to offer at trial state-of-the-art evidence, which is
evidence indicating that, based on the scientific knowledge
available at the time the product was manufactured or distributed,
the defendant manufacturer had no way of knowing of the harm the
product could cause. 3 This evidence is relevant since it proves
that the defendant could not warn of a defect that was unknowable
at the time of production of the product.14
Plaintiffs in asbestos cases argue that under the traditional
doctrine of strict products liability," which ignores the culpability
of the defendant and only looks to the safe or unsafe character of
the product, the knowledge of the manufacturer is irrelevant.' 6
Further, the plaintiffs claim that the manufacturers are in a much
10. Beshada, 90 NJ. at 196,447 A.2d at 542 (limited by Feldman, 97 NJ. at 455,479 A.2d
at 387-88).
11. I1
12. See, Labaton, supra note 4, at BI col. 1 (noting that federal judges across the nation have
been competing with each other to be the first to resolve the asbestos litigation crisis); O'Reilly, Risks
ofAssumptions: Impacts of Regulatory Label Warnings Upon Industrial Products Liability, 37 CATH.
U. L RaV. 85, 85 (1987) (addressing the question of liability of an industrial chemical product
manufacturer for failure to warn of the chemical's health related risks).
13. Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 53 Cal. 3d 987, 990, 810 P.2d 549, 550,
281 Cal. Rptr. 528, 529 (1991); Hensler, Er. AL., supra note 2, at 46.
14. Anderson, 53 Cal. 3d at 1002, 810 P.2d at 558, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 537.
15. See infra, notes 51-70 and accompanying text (explaining in detail the doctrine of strict
liability).
16. Only a minority of jurisdictions have agreed that the defendant's knowledge is irrelevant
in strict liability failure to warn cases. See, eg., In re Asbestos Cases 829 F.2d 907, 909 (9th Cir.
1987); Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhattan Inc., 69 Haw. 287, 740 P.2d 548, 549 (Haw. 1987); In re
Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases, 665 F. Supp. 1454, 1458 (D.C. Haw. 1986); Halphen v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110, 114 (La. 1986); Elmore v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 673 S.W.2d
434,438 (Mo. 1984); Beshada, 90 NJ. at 204, 447 A.2d at 546 (reasoning laterrejected in Feldman
v. Lederle Lab., 97 NJ. 429, 455, 479 A.2d 374, 386-88 (1984)).
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better position to compensate for injuries resulting from the use of
their products than are the victims."
On the other hand, manufacturers contend that since there was
no knowledge as to the harmful effects of asbestos at the time the
product was developed, the manufacturers were incapable of
warning the plaintiffs of the product's dangers.18 Additionally,
manufacturers insist that by excluding evidence of
"unknowability," the courts will cause the manufacturers to be
placed in the role of insurers of their products, thereby holding
them absolutely liable for all damages resulting from the
products.19 The manufacturers maintain that this result was not the
objective of the strict products liability doctrine.2"
California appellate courts disagree on the issue of whether
evidence of the manufacturer's knowledge regarding the harmful
effects of asbestos is admissible in products liability actions based
on an alleged failure to warn of a product's risks."1 The Supreme
17. Beshada, 90 NJ. at 205, 447 A.2d at 547; Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal.
2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963).
18. Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 53 Cal. 3d 987, 992, 810 P.2d 549,551,
281 Cal. Rptr. 528,530 (1991); Vermeulen v. Superior Court, 204 Cal. App. 3d 1192, 1206,251 Cal.
Rptr. 805, 813-14 (1988) (disagreed with by Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 217 Cal.
App. 3d 772, 266 Cal. Rptr. 204 (2nd Dist. 1990), review gr., in part Anderson v. Owens-Coming
Fiberglass Corp., 790 P.2d 238, 269 Cal. Rptr. 74, (1990), and reprinted for tracking pending review
Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 227 Cal. App. 3d 1035 (2nd Dist. 1990) superseded
Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 53 Cal. 3d 987, 810 P.2d 549, 281 Cal. Rptr. 528
(1991)); Klein, 'Old Products: The Admissibility of State of the Art Evidence in Product Liability
Cases, 9 J. OF PROD. LUAB. 233, 236 (1986) (citing the RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TORTS §
402A(2)(a) (1965)).
19. Anderson, 53 Cal. 3d at 993, 810 P.2d at 552, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 531; Klein, supra note
18, at 236; Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. W., 13 (1965). See Anderson, 53
Cal. 3d at 1002, 810 P.2d at 558, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 537 (explaining absolute liability as where
manufacturers are held automatically liable for injuries caused by their product merely because of the
fact that the product was not labelled). In Anderson, the court declared that this is not the purpose
or goal of the failure to warn strict liability theory. Rd.
20. Anderson, 53 Cal. 3d at 993, 810 P.2d at 552, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 531. Many recent cases
agree that strict liability was not intended to make manufacturers and distributors insurers of the
safety of the use of their products. Id.; Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1066, 751 P.2d
470, 480-81,245 Cal. Rptr. 412, 422 (1988); Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 402 N.E.2d 194, 199
(111. 1980); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 733, 575 P.2d 1162, 1166, 144 Cal. Rptr.
380, 384 (1978).
21. Anderson, 53 Cal. 3d at 991, 810 P.2d at 550, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 529.
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Court of California attempted to resolve this conflict in Anderson
v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp.Y2
In Anderson, the court permitted the manufacturer of asbestos
and asbestos products to introduce state-of-the-art evidence, or, in
other words, evidence demonstrating that the defendant neither
knew nor could have known of the potential harm its product could
cause based on the scientific knowledge available at the time of
manufacture or distribution.23 In effect, the court held that Owens-
Corning could not be held strictly liable for Anderson's injuries
unless the manufacturer knew at the time of manufacture or
distribution that its products could cause asbestosis and other
asbestos related diseases, and that Owens-Coming failed to warn
of these dangers. 24 Hence, the use of state-of-the-art evidence
would enable Owens-Corning to demonstrate that it did not have,
nor could have had, such knowledge at the time of manufacture or
distribution.'
While most courts agree that a manufacturer must warn of
hazards inherent in its product that are reasonably foreseeable or
discoverable,26 the courts disagree in respect to hazards that are
22. 53 Cal. 3d 987, 810 P.2d 549, 281 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1991).
23. Anderson, 53 Cal. 3d at 1004, 810 P.2d at 559,281 Cal. Rptr. at 538. See Vermeulen v.
Superior Court, 204 Cal. App. 3d 1192, 1199, 251 Cal. Rptr. 805, 809 (1st Dist. 1988) (disagreed
with by Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 217 Cal. App. 3d 772,266 Cal. Rptr. 204 (2nd
Dist. 1990), review gr., in part Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 790 P.2d 238,269 Cal.
Rptr. 74, (1990), and reprinted for tracking pending review Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass
Corp., 227 Cal. App. 3d 1035 (2nd Dist. 1990) superseded Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass
Corp., 53 Cal. 3d 987, 810 P.2d 549,281 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1991)) (indicating that the term "state-of-
the-art" is chameleon-like, since it refers to everything from ordinary customs of the trade to the
objective existence of technological information to economic feasibility). In Vermeulen, the parties
could not agree on a definition of state-of-the-art, however the appellate court relied on the trial
court's definition: facts which were either known or discoverable in light of the scientific and
technological knowledge available to the manufacturer at the time of manufacture and distribution.
Id. at 1199, 1202,251 Cal. Rptr. at 809, 811. It has been suggested that the meanings of state-of-the-
art evidence are so diverse and so easily confused that it would be best to eschew its use completely.
Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 734, 750-51 (1983).
24. Anderson, 53 Cal. 3d at 1004, 810 P.2d at 559, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 538.
25. Id
26. See Polin, supra note 1, at 11 (defining reasonably foreseeable or discoverable hazards
as those that a manufacturer knows of or should know of in the course of business). The state of the
law on "knowable" hazards remains settled: the failure to furnish an adequate warning may subject
manufacturers and distributors to strict liability when they knew or should have known of the hazard.
1811
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"unknowable ' '27 at the time of manufacture or distribution. 8
Prior to the Anderson decision, the California Supreme Court had
not ruled on the issue of whether state-of-the-art evidence should
be admissible as a defense to manufacturers who did not warn of
unknowable hazards.29  When dealing with knowable, or
Vermeulen, 204 Cal. App. 3d at 1203, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 811.
27. See Polinsupra note 1, at 11-12 (explaining that "unknowable" hazards are those which
are not reasonably foreseeable or discoverable); Anderson, 53 Cal. 3d at 990, 810 P.2d at 550, 281
Cal. Rptr. at 529 (indicating that "unknowable" refers to risks that were neither known nor knowable
by the application of scientific knowledge available at the time of manufacture andlor distribution).
28. The majority view permits the state-of-the-art defense. See, e.g., RESTATEM ENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 402A (1965); Vermeulen, 204 Cal. App. 3d at 1204, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 812 (stating that
most courts agree that liability should be imposed only if the manufacturer knew, or should have
known, of the presence of the danger); Oakes v. E. 1. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 272 Cal. App. 2d
645, 650-51, 77 Cal. Rptr. 709, 713 (1969) (holding that liability must not be imposed when the
manufacturer had no way of knowing of the danger). However, in a minority of jurisdictions, courts
have not permitted state-of-the-art evidence to establish a defense. Butsee Halphen v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110, 115-16 (La. 1986) (holding inadmissible evidence of the state-of-the-art
defense that was offered to establish whether the manufacturer and seller of asbestos products knew
or should have known of the hazards of asbestos); In re Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases, 699 F. Supp.
233,235-36 (D.C. Haw. 1988) (finding that state-of-the-art evidence is not relevant in failure to warn
cases brought in strict liability because the imposition of liability for failure to warn of unknowable
defects will promote risk-spreading, encourage accident avoidance, and eliminate the difficult task
of proving the manufacturer's negligence); Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 69 Haw. 287,740
P.2d 548, 549 (Hawaii 1987) (holding state-of-the-art evidence inadmissible for the purpose of
determining whether the defendants knew or should have known of the dangers of asbestos); Elmore
v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 673 S.W.2d 434,438 (Mo. 1984) (denying defendant's proffered state-of-the-
art defense because the plaintiff brought his case on a defective design theory, hence issues of the
defendant's knowledge of the product's danger were irrelevant); lowers v. Commercial Union Ins.
Co., 435 So. 2d 575, 578 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983) (stating that the inability of a defendant
manufacturer to know or prevent a risk is not a defense in strict liability cases); Beshada v. Johns-
Manville Prod. Corp., 90 NJ. 191,209, 447 A.2d 539, 549 (1982) (stating that the defense of state-
of-the-art evidence may not be raised in products liability cases based on strict liability for failure
to warn) (limited by Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 97 NJ. 429,455, 479 A.2d 374, 386-88 (1984)). See
also Klein, supra, note 18, at 239, 243-44, 248 (stating that, as of 1984, a number of jurisdictions,
including California, had not addressed the issue of whether state-of-the-art evidence is admissible
in failure to warn cases). Specifically, California, Delaware, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi,
Montana, Nevada, South Carolina, Vermont, and Wisconsin had not addressed this issue. IL
However, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, New Mexico, Ohio, Tennessee, and West Virginia do admit state-of-the-art evidence in
failure to warn cases. lad Only Massachusetts and North Dakota clearly do not allow the evidence.
Id The remainder of the states are either uncertain on the issue, or permit state-of-the-art evidence
in failure to warn cases only under certain circumstances. Id See generally Polin, supra note 1, at
11-12 (detailing the dispute in the law of strict liability in regards to unknowable hazards).
29. See Klein, supra note 18, at 243,248; Anderson, 53 Cal. 3d at 991,810 P.2d at 550, 281
Cal. Rptr. at 529 (asserting that California had not yet decided whether to permit the state-of-the-art
defense in failure to warn cases).
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reasonably foreseeable hazards, the doctrine of negligence provides
that a manufacturer will be held liable if the manufacturer knew,
or should have known of a danger inherent in its product and this
danger was of such character that a reasonable manufacturer would
have warned consumers and users of its existence.30 Hence, the
Anderson court, by incorporating the knowledge or knowability
component of negligence into the strict liability for failure to warn
claims, arguably has exempted manufacturers of all varieties of
products from strict liability in failure to warn claims.
3 1
Consequently, the Anderson decision may be interpreted as
implying that all claims brought on the failure to warn theory of
strict products liability may be analyzed under the negligence
standard.32
This Note examines the approach used by the California
Supreme Court, in Anderson, in deciding whether state-of-the-art
evidence is admissible in failure to warn strict products liability
actions. Part I discusses the evolution of strict liability and its
underlying policies. 33 Part II summarizes the facts of Anderson v.
Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp. and reviews the majority,
concurring, and dissenting opinions in that decision.' Finally, Part
III discusses the legal ramifications that the court's decision in
Anderson will have on future strict products liability claims.
35
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Under the doctrine of strict liability, a manufacturer will be
held liable for all damage caused by its products if the plaintiff can
prove that these products were defective at the time of manufacture
30. Anderson, 53 Cal. 3d at 1003, 810 P.2d at 559, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 538.
31. Ra
32. l
33. See infra notes 36-245 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 246-334 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 335-401 and accompanying text.
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or distribution.36 Originally, strict products liability was pioneered
in order to relieve an injured plaintiff from the burdens of proof
inherent in alternate remedies.3 7 Particularly, strict liability was
implemented to eliminate the requirement that the injured plaintiff
prove that the manufacturer failed to act as would other
manufacturers of similar products in similar circumstances.38
Consequently, individuals who oppose the admission of state-
of-the-art evidence assert that by permitting manufacturers to
introduce evidence of the unknowability of the product's risks, the
courts would be improperly infusing negligence concepts back into
strict liability cases because, in strict liability, the knowledge of the
manufacturer should be irrelevant.3 9 These opponents contend that
the use of state-of-the-art evidence defeats the central reason for
implementing strict liability in the first place.' Nevertheless, the
court in Anderson rejected this contention.41 Instead, the Anderson
court professed that the founders of strict liability did not intend to
36. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965). This section provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user
or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harn thereby caused to
the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change
in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
l
37. Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 53 Cal. 3d 987, 1000,810 P.2d 549,557,
281 Cal. Rptr. 528,536 (1991); Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049,1056,751 P.2d 470,474,
245 Cal. Rptr. 412, 415 (1988); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 CaL 3d 121, 133, 501 P.2d 1153,
1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433,442 (1972); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57,63, 377
P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963). See infra, note 52 and accompanying text (detailing
three reasons for establishing and implementing strict liability, other than to relieve a plaintiff from
the burdens of proving that the manufacturer acted negligently); notes 54-57, 60-61 and
accompanying text (detailing the two alternate remedies of negligence and breach of warranty).
38. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1057, 751 P.2d at 474, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 415.
39. Anderson, 53 Cal. 3d at 1000, 810 P.2d at 557, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 536; Barker v. Lull
Eng'g, Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 433, 573 P.2d 443, 456, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 238 (1978); Cronin, 8 Cal.
3d at 133, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
40. Anderson, 53 Cal. 3d at 1000, 810 P.2d at 557, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 536.
41. Ma at 1002, 810 P.2d at 558, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 537.
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make the manufacturer or distributor the insurer of the safety of
their products, which, in essence, would impose absolute
liability.42
To better understand the California Supreme Court's decision
in Anderson, and the implications this decision will have on the
future of strict products liability, relevant case law and pertinent
Restatement sections relied on by the Anderson court will be
reviewed. First, it will be necessary to analyze the development of
strict liability, emphasizing the public policy concerns which led to
both the establishment of, and exceptions to, the doctrine which
holds manufacturers strictly liable for the injuries resulting from the
products they place on the market.43 Second, several cases which
established and refined the doctrine of strict liability in California
will be discussed." Third, the special treatment that has been
accorded to asbestos cases in some jurisdictions will be
examined.45 Finally, the disagreement among the California Courts
of Appeal concerning the admissibility of state-of-the-art evidence
will be discussed.46
A. The Development of Strict Products Liability
Prior to the evolution of strict products liability, tort recovery
was dependant upon a showing that the manufacturer either acted
negligently, or breached an express or implied warranty. 7
Particularly, a plaintiff had to prove that the manufacturer did not
act in a manner as would have been expected of a reasonably
prudent manufacturer in similar circumstances. 4' However, the
42. Id. at 1004-05, 810 P.2d at 558, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 538.
43. See infra notes 47-91 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 92-202 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 203-224 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 225-245 and accompanying text.
47. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 133, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr.
433, 442; O'Reilly, supra note 12, at 89. See infra notes 55-56, 60-61 and accompanying text
(defining both the negligence and warranty theories).
48. Klein, supra note 18, at 235; MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.ME
1850, 1052 (N.Y. 1916). This negligence theory was later propounded in the Second Restatement of
Torts, section 395. See RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 395 (1965).
1815
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negligence theory offered limited relief to people who, for instance,
develop chronic illnesses after long latency periods, such as
asbestosis. 49 The complex relationship between exposure and
contracting such illnesses makes it difficult for the plaintiff to
prove that the manufacturer's conduct is what actually caused the
plaintiff's injuries.5
Ultimately, strict products liability was developed.5" The
rationale of strict liability, in holding a manufacturer liable for
injuries caused by its products, is that the manufacturer is in the
best position to guard against the recurrence of hazards, insure
against the risk of such hazards, and distribute the cost of insurance
among the consumers.52  Strict products liability thereby
discourages manufacturers from producing defective and hazardous
products.53 Before discussing further the development of strict
liability, it is helpful to acquire an understanding of the alternate
theories a plaintiff has available for a products liability action.
1. General Rules and Definitions Regarding Negligence,
Breach of Warranty, and Strict Liability
Generally, workers who claim that a chemical product
manufacturer caused them harm by exposing them to dangerous
chemicals in the workplace have three primary causes of action
49. O'Reilly, supra note 12, at 89.
50. l See Hensler, Er. A.., supra note 2, at Executive Summary xi (stating that it is
extremely difficult for workers, who were exposed to a variety of products over a long period of
time, and for whom the identity of the manufacturers of those products was then not important, to
prove that the defendant's specific product is what caused the plaintiff's injury).
51. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 377 P.2d 897, 900,27 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 700 (1963); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co, 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944)
(Traynor, L, concurring); RE TATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) (providing the evolution
of strict products liability). See also infra notes 103-118 and accompanying text (explaining the
adoption of strict liability in Califonia).
52. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1057, 751 P.2d at 474, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 415.
53. Id But see id. at 1063, 751 P.2d at 479, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 420 (providing that imposing
strict liability on manufacturers might cause them to be reluctant to conduct research to develop
pharmaceuticals that would prove beneficial because they will fear the imposition of large adverse
monetary judgments).
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available: negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability.54
Negligence has been defined as conduct that involves an
unreasonably high risk of causing harm, or as conduct that falls
below the legal standard for the protection of others against
unreasonable risks of harm.55 In negligence actions, the conduct
of the defendant manufacturer is measured against the conduct that
would be expected from a reasonably prudent manufacturer in
similar circumstances.5 6 Thus, in negligence suits, emphasis is
placed on the manufacturer's conduct."
On the other hand, strict liability concentrates on the condition
of the product itself.5" Particularly, in strict liability suits, if a
product is in a defective condition, unreasonably dangerous at the
time the product leaves the manufacturer's hands, the manufacturer
will be held liable for any resulting harm, even though the
manufacturer used extreme care and precaution in the preparation
and sale of his product.59
The final type of cause of action available to an injured
plaintiff who claims that the manufacturer's product caused the
harm is breach of warranty. Under the theory of breach of
warranty, if a seller or manufacturer expressly represents that the
product has certain qualities, which the product later turns out not
to have, the injured consumer may sue for breach of this
warranty.' Additionally, the manufacturer or seller may be held
54. O'Reilly, supra note 12, at 88. See generally, Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability:
A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modem Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461
(1985) (discussing the three alternatives; strict liability, warranty, and negligence, as they coexist
today).
55. REsTATEMENT (SECoND) oF TORTS § 282 (1965). According to Prosser and Keeton, a
seller will be liable for negligence in the manufacture or sale of any product if, as a result of this
negligence, the product was defective and would likely inflict substantial harm. W. PAGE KE N
Er AL, PROSSER AND KEnTON ON Tim LAw oF ToRTS, § 96, at 683 (5th ed. 1984).
56. Klein, supra note 18, at 235.
57. Id.
58. ld.
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). See supra note 36 (providing the full
text of Section 402A).
60. Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409, 412 (Wash. 1932), adhered to
Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 465, 15 P.2d 1118 (1932) and appeal after remanded Baxter
v. Ford Motor Co., 179 Wash. 123, 35 P.2d 1090 (1934). The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)
Section 2-313 provides that an "affirmation of fact or promise" by the seller about the product, by
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liable if a plaintiff is harmed due to defects in the product where
a warranty as to the quality of goods could be implied merely from
the fact that the product is offered for sale.6'
Although strict liability is the most recently developed of the
three theories used i product liability litigation, it dominates the
field of products liability as a whole.62 The strict liability theory
permits plaintiffs to allege three different types of defects in
products: design defects, manufacturing defects, and warning
defects.63 Although the court in Anderson only addressed the duty
to warn," it is important to briefly explain all three types of
defects in order to fully understand the implications of the
Anderson decision and its effect on strict liability as a whole.
Manufacturing defects exist where the particular item that
injures the plaintiff is different from the other items manufactured
by the defendant, due to a defect or an error in the manufacturing
process. 5 In manufacturing defects the finished product is
different from the manufacturer's intended result." Design
defects, on the other hand, exist if, at the time the product leaves
the seller's hands, the product is in a condition not contemplated
by the consumer,67 thereby causing the product to be unreasonably
a description of the goods, or by displaying a sample or model, amounts to an express warranty. UCC
§ 2-313 (1987). See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697,700 n.2 (1963) (providing that an express warranty exists where the defendant seller makes
a promise to a purchaser with the intention of inducing the purchaser to buy the product, and the
purchaser does buy the product relying upon the promise).
61. See UCC § 2-314(1) (1987) (providing that a warranty of merchantability is implied in
a contract for the sale of the product so long as the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that
kind). The UCC states that for the goods to be merchantable they must be "fit for the ordinary
purposes for which such goods are used." IX § 2-314(2). However, this implied warranty of
merchantability only arises if the seller ordinarily deals in goods of that kind. Id
62. O'Reilly, supra note 12, at 89 (citing Prosser, The Fail of the Citadel (Strict Liability to
the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791, 805 (1966)).
63. O'Reilly, supra note 12, at 90.
64. Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 53 Cal. 3d 987, 991, 810 P.2d 549, 550,
281 Cal. Rptr. 528, 529 (1991).
65. Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1057,751 P.2d 470,474,245 Cal. Rptr. 412,
416 (1988); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382,388-95,111 N.E. 1050,1052-55 (1916).
66. Id A good example of a manufacturing defect is that of the exploding coca cola bottle
in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
67. A product may be in a condition not expected by the consumer or user if, for instance,
the product lacks a safety device. Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413,420,573 P.2d 443,448,
143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 230 (1978).
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dangerous.' Even products that are considered to be perfectly
manufactured may be defective because of a flaw in the design of
the product.69  Finally, warning defects exist where the
manufacturer knew, or should have known, that the product had a
propensity to be dangerous when used in a certain way, yet failed
to warn the consumer or user as to the correct method of use.
70
68. REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment g (1965); Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at
1057,751 P.2d at 474, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 416; Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 418, 573 P.2d at 446, 143 Cal.
Rptr. at 228. Comment g provides:
The rule stated in [Section 402A] applies only where the product is, at the time it leaves
the seller's hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate user, which will be
unreasonably dangerous to him. The seller is not liable when he delivers the product in
a safe condition, and subsequent mishandling or other causes make it harmful by the time
it is consumed. The burden of proof that the product was in a defective condition at the
time that it left the hands of the particular seller is upon the injured plaintiff; and unless
evidence can be produced which will support the conclusion that it was then defective,
the burden is not sustained.
Safe condition at the time of delivery by the seller will, however, include proper packaging,
necessary sterilization, and other precautions required to permit the product to remain safe for a
normal length of time when handled in a normal manner.
69. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1057, 751 P.2d at 474, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 416; Keeton et aL, supra
note 55, § 96, at 688.
70. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTs § 402A, comment j (1965). See id: (stating that in
order to prevent a product from being unreasonably dangerous, and thus giving rise to strict liability,
the seller may need to give directions or a warning on the container of the item as to its use);
Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 53 Cal. 3d 987,996, 810 P.2d 549,553,281 Cal. Rptr.
528, 533 (1991) (defining warning defects as either inadequate warnings, or failure to warn); Finn
v. G.D. Searle & Co., 35 Cal. 3d 691, 699, 677 P.2d 1147, 1152, 200 Cal. Rptr. 870, 875 (1984)
(providing that to determine whether a defect exists the jury must decide whether a product, designed
and produced flawlessly, may nevertheless be hazardous to a user solely because the lack of a
warning itself causes the product to be dangerous).
Actually, warning defect allegations may be brought under any of the strict liability, warranty,
or negligence theories. Polin, Failure to Warn as Proximate Cause of Injury, 8 AM. JUr. PROOF OF
FACTS 3d, 547, 557-58 (1990). Under the negligence doctrine, a plaintiff may allege that a
manufacturer was negligent for failing to warn of risks associated with the manufacturer's product.
Klein, supra note 18, at 239-40. In such cases, actual or constructive knowledge of the product's
dangers is imputed to the manufacturer Id. However, knowledge is imputed only to the extent of that
known by other similarly situated manufacturers. l
On the other hand, when a plaintiff alleges that a manufacturer is strictly liable for failing to
warn of risks inherent in the product, expert knowledge is essentially imputed to the defendant. Il
at 239. Thus, a much higher degree of knowledge is imputed to the defendant in strict liability than
in negligence, thereby making the plaintiff's burden of proof slightly lighter in strict liability than in
negligence. Polin, supra at 558. For instance, if experts in the field knew of a particular risk inherent
in a product, a manufacturer who made the product without furnishing a warning of this danger could
be held strictly liable for harm resulting from this danger, even though the manufacturer was not an
expert and therefore had no reason to know of the danger, and other manufacturers in similar
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In Anderson, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant should be
held strictly liable for failing to warn of the potential danger that
could result from working closely and extensively with asbestos
products. 1 The court in Anderson was forced to grapple with
determining whether the truly strict notion of strict liability should
apply to manufacturers of asbestos products, or whether the
seemingly modem trend of & fault standard, exemplified by the
prescription drug cases,72 should apply. 3 Under the truly strict
definition of strict liability74 the manufacturer's knowledge
regarding any potential risks inherent in its product was irrelevant,
and thus not looked to.7' This was so because strict liability was
pioneered in order to relieve injured plaintiffs from the burden of
proving negligence components, such as the manufacturer's
knowledge at the time of manufacture or distribution.76
2. The Purpose of Strict Products Liability
As our industrial society progressed, handicrafts came to be
replaced by mass production and the close relationship between the
manufacturer and consumer came to a halt.7 Manufacturing
circumstances had no reason to know of the danger. Klein, supra note 18, at 239. Yet, this would
not be true in negligence. Id But see, KEnToN Er Ai, supra note 55, § 96, at 684 (providing that
in negligence, a defendant who fails to inspect or test a product to discover possible defects, or the
existence of dangerous propensities, may be held to the standard of an expert in the field). See also,
Besbada v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 90 NJ. 191,200, 447 A.2d 539,544 (stating that for design
defect cases, strict liability is identical to negligence, except that in strict liability the foresecability
of the manufacturer as to the dangerous propensity of the alleged defective product is imputed to the
manufacturer).
71. Anderson, 53 Cal. 3d at 992, 810 P.2d at 550-51, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 529-30.
72. See infra notes 177-202 and accompanying text (discussing the prescription drug exception
to strict liability).
73. Anderson, 53 Cal. 3d at 990, 810 P.2d at 550,281 Cal. Rptr. at 529.
74. California, followed by the Restatement of Torts, established the truly strict doctrine of
strict liability. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453,462, 150 P.2d 436,441 (1944)
(Traynor, . concurring); Cmeenman v. Yuba Power Prod., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 64,27 Cal. Rptr. 697,701
(1963); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A (1965).
75. See Escola, 24 Cal. 2d at 462, 150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, 3. concurring); Greenman, 59
Cal. 2d at 64, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
76. See Escola, 24 Cal. 2d at 462,150 P.2d at 441 (1944) (TraynorJ. concurring); Greenman,
59 Cal. 2d at 64,27 Cal. Rptr. at 701; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 402A (1965).
77. Escoa, 24 Cal. 2d at 467, 150 P.2d at 443 (Traynor, 3. concurring).
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processes became inaccessible to the general public, thereby
depriving consumers of the means to investigate the soundness of
the product." Consumers began to rely on the reputation of the
manufacturer, or the trade mark, in choosing which product was of
the best quality, or safest to purchase.79 In turn, manufacturers
sought the faith of the consumers by increasing their standards of
inspection, and by offering to replace defective products or furnish
refunds for such products." As a result, public policy demanded
that manufacturers be responsible for the quality of their products
regardless of the reasonableness of their conduct.8"
Scholars typically cite four justifications for strict products
liability: (1) to relieve an injured plaintiff from the difficulty of
proving that a manufacturer has acted negligently; (2) to encourage
manufacturers to develop safer products; (3) to protect the
expectations of consumers in regard to the product's safety; and (4)
to promote risk-spreading among the manufacturers. 2 As to the
78. IM
79. Id
80. Id
81. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57,63,377 P.2d 897,901,27 Cal. Rptr.
697, 701 (1963); Escola, 24 Cal. 2d at 463, 150 P.2d at 443 (Traynor, J. concurring); Priest, supra
note 54, at 494-96. In Escola, Justice Traynor insisted that the manufacturer's obligation to the
consumer be conformed to meet the needs resulting from the changing relationship between the
manufacturer and the consumers. Escola, 24 Cal. 2d at 463, 150 P.2d at 443 (Traynor, J., concurring).
According to Justice Traynor, the imposition of absolute liability was the means to the ends. Id. See
Dalrymple, Brief Opposing Strict Liability in Tort, Restatement of Law, Second, Torts, Section 4024,
at 16, The Defense Research Institute, Inc. (1966) (stating that as industrialization, mechanization,
and communication grew, the concerns for safety grew as well).
82. Kelso, Brown v. Abbot Laboratories and Strict Products Liability, 20 PAc. L. 1, 6 (1988)
(citing Prosser, The Fall ofthe Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer) 50 MINN. L. REV. 791,799-
800 (1966)). See Barham, The Viability of Comparative Negligence as a Defense to Strict Liability
in Louisiana, 44 LA. L REV. 1171, 1180 (1984) (suggesting that the economic theory underlying
strict products liability is based on the notion that defendants, who are manufacturers or sellers, are
in the best position to distribute the loss among the consuming public because they can obtain
insurance or increase the price of the product to cover the cost of the damage, and they are in a
position to reduce losses by developing and marketing a better, safer product); O'Reilly, supra note
12, at 112 (asserting that the economic justification for strict products liability is that manufacturers
are able to spread the losses caused by defective products across many customers); Note, The Essence
of the Agent Orange Litigation: The Government Contract Defense, 12 HOFSTRA L REV. 983, 1011
- (1983) (purporting that the theory of strict products liability is based on the following: An economic
principle which suggests that the loss should be distributed to those who are best able to afford it;
a deterrence principle which attempts to prevent the occurrence of future harm; and a moral principle
which examines the moral aspect of the defendant's conduct). But see, Kelso, supra, at 6-9
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first and third justifications, Dean Prosser explained in 1965 that,
by placing their goods in the marketplace, manufacturers represent
to the public that the products are suitable and safe for use.83
Consumers, relying on these representations, purchase these
products expecting them to be safe. 4 Therefore, Prosser asserted,
the manufacturer who invited and solicited the use of the product
should not be permitted to avoid liability by claiming that all
reasonable care was used in manufacturing the product.8 5 Instead,
strict liability would impose liability regardless of the
manufacturer's conduct, so long as the product was defective when
it left the manufacturer's hands. 6
The second and fourth justifications, to encourage the
manufacture of safer products and to promote risk-spreading, can
be combined to encompass what is known as the enterprise liability
theory. 7 This theory stands for the principle that the manufacturer
is in the best position to bear and distribute the losses by securing
market insurance, self-insuring, or by spreading costs to the
consumers in the form of higher prices.8 Further, the enterprise
liability theory states that the manufacturer who introduces a
product into the stream of commerce should be liable for harm
(suggesting that none of these four rationales supports the notion of making products liability strict
liability instead of fault-based liability or even absolute liability).
83. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MMNN. L REV. 791,
799-800 (1966).
84. d
85. Id.
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TOnTS § 402A (1965).
87. See Priest, supra note 54, at 463 (definition of enterprise liability).
88. Id, See Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 31, 560 P.2d 3, 8-9, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574, 579
(1977) (providing that the policy underlying strict liability is the protection of otherwise defenseless
victims of defective products, and the spreading of the cost of compensating these victims throughout
society); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697, 701 (1963) (holding that the producers of defective products should bear the burden of
compensating injured plaintiffs because they are in a better position to spread the economic losses
by increasing consumer prices and obtaining compensation through insurance). See generally
Comment, The Government Contract Defense: An Overview, HOWARD U. 275, 292-95 (1984)
(suggesting four policy considerations for imposing strict liability: Enterprise liability; market
deterrence; compensation; and implied representation of safety); Note, The Fssence of the Agent
Orange Litigation: The Government Contract Defense, supra note 82, at 1011-16 (1983) (discussing
the policies underlying the emergence of strict products liability); Prosser, supra note 83, at 799-800
(providing that under the risk-distributing theory the supplier, who is in the best position to insure
against liability and add the cost to the price of the product, is the one who should be held liable).
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resulting from the product because the manufacturer is the one who
is in the best position to guarantee the safety of its products.8 9 For
instance, the manufacturer can either improve the quality of the
product or furnish an adequate warning of known conditions on the
product.' Consequently, the promulgators of strict products
liability believed that its imposition would create an incentive for
manufacturers to design and produce safer products.91
B. Case Law Adopting the Theory of Strict Liability
Prior to the California Supreme Court's decision in Greenman
v. Yuba Power Products,92 the only options injured plaintiffs had
at their disposal were to sue the manufacturer in negligence or
breach of warranty.9' The warranty theory, which is based on a
contractual relationship between the consumer and the
manufacturer,94 traditionally required the plaintiff to act in
reliance upon either an express or implied promise by the
defendant.95 However, it was sometimes impossible to determine
whether the plaintiff actually relied on any such promise by the
defendant, especially where the plaintiff did not even know the
name of the manufacturer.96 Therefore, it has been suggested that
89. Speidel, Warranty Theory, Economic Loss, and the Privity Requirement: Once More into
the Void, 67 B.U.L. REv. 9,21-22 (1987).
90. Id.
91. Id at 22. See Prosser, supra note 83, at 799-800 (setting forth the most widely accepted
explanations for strict products liability); Henderson, Coping With the Time Dimension in Products
Liability 69 CAIp. L. REv. 919, 933 (1981) (professing that strict liability is predicted to increase
general or "market" deterrence). But see Moore & Hengesbach, Comment k- A Prescription For
Over-The-Counter Drug Industry, 22 PAc. LJ. 43, 45-6 n.12 (1990) (noting that the market
deterrence argument has been rejected by many scholars and has not been explicitly approved by the
California Supreme Court); Kelso, supra note 82, at 8 (advocating that the public policy interest in
encouraging manufacturers to make safer products is not furthered by strict liability).
92. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
93. See Priest, supra note 54, at 461 (indicating that through the early 1960's breach of
warranty and, to a lesser extent, negligence theories controlled defective product cases).
94. Priest, supra note 54 at 449; KEErON Lrr AL., supra note 55, ch. 17, § 96 at 684.
95. KEMTON Er Ai-, supra note 55, § 97, at 691.
96. Ia. See Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YAI.E
L J. 1099, 1130-31 (stating that the contract rules governing breach of warranty are a "booby-trap
for the unwary").
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the difficulties inherent in proving breach of warranty caused the
use of this theory to decline sharply.'
Furthermore, under the theory of negligence, plaintiffs are faced
with three difficult tasks." First, the plaintiff must prove that a
defect in the defendant's product is what caused the injury. 99
Second, the plaintiff must prove that the defect existed at the time
the product left the defendant's hands."° Third, the plaintiff is
required to establish that the defect in the product was due to the
fact that the defendant's conduct was unreasonable under the
circumstances.'' Since it may be impossible for a plaintiff to
prove all three of these elements, the California Supreme Court
ultimately decided that it was time to provide plaintiffs with
another avenue for recovery, particularly by disposing of the third
requirement."
1. California Introduces the Doctrine of Strict Liability
The strict products liability theory was first introduced by
Justice Traynor in his concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co."0 3 That opinion served as the basis for the California
97. KEmEN Er AL., supra note 55, § 98, at 692. It has also been suggested that the rise of
the strict liability doctrine, which is much more suitable for personal injury cases then the contract-
based warranty theory, have caused warranty suits to be used less frequently then in the past. It §
98, at 693. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 61, 377 P.2d 897, 899-900,27
Cal. Rptr. 697, 699-700 (1963) (asserting that the rules governing the warranty theory, which were
developed to meet the needs of commercial transactions, cannot be invoked to also control the
manufacturer's liability to plaintiffs who are injured by the manufacturers defective products). As the
rules governing warranty law were revised over the years, it became clear that the warranty case was
virtually identical to a strict liability claim. Id. See Prosser, supra note 83, at 804 (indicating that
some courts still refer to the "language of'warranty'; but the forty-year reign of the word is ending,
and it is passing quietly down the drain").
98. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), supra note 96,
at 1114.
99. Id
100. Id.
101. Id; REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
102. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62-63, 377 P.2d 897, 900-01, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 700-01 (1963).
103. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440, (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). In &scola, a
bottle of Coca Cola exploded in a waitress' hand. Iad (Traynor, J., concurring). The broken pieces
of the bottle inflicted a deep five-inch cut, severing blood vessels, nerves and muscles of the thumb
and palm of the plaintiffs hand. Ida (Traynor, J., concurring). The plaintiff alleged in her complaint
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Supreme Court's decision in Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products,1"4 where Justice Traynor wrote the opinion for the
majority.0 5 In Greenman, the plaintiff was using a power tool on
a piece of wood when, unexpectedly, the piece of wood flew out
of the tool and struck him in the head, inflicting serious
injuries."° At trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the
retailer for breach of implied warranties, and against the
manufacturer for negligence and breach of express warranties.0 7
Both the manufacturer and the plaintiff appealed. 0 8
The California Supreme Court affirmed the judgment and
articulated the rule that a manufacturer, who places a product on
the market knowing that it will be used without inspection for
defects, is strictly liable in tort if the product actually proves to be
defective and causes injury."° The court declared that the
plaintiff had the burden of proving that a defect in the design or
manufacture of the product caused the product to injure the
plaintiff while the product was being used in a way in which it was
that the Coca Cola Bottling Company was negligent for selling bottles which, because of some defect
in the bottle, were dangerous and likely to explode. Id (Traynor, J., concurring). Although the
plaintiff was unable to prove any specific acts of negligence on the part of the defendant, she
prevailed under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Ld. at 457, 150 P.2d at 440 (Traynor, J., concurring).
In Escola, Justice Traynor urged in a concurring opinion that the court implement and apply
a theory of absolute liability. Ia at 461, 150 P.2d at 440 (Traynor, J., concurring). Justice Traynor
noted that persons injured from defective products are not prepared to meet the consequences
associated with such injuries. IL at 462, 150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, I., concurring). Justice Traynor
stated that even if the manufacturer is not negligent, it is essential that responsibility be fixed
wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards that are inherent in defective products that reach
the market. L at 462, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Traynor, J., concurring). Justice Traynor asserted that this
policy would discourage the marketing of products that have defects. IL (Traynor, J., concurring).
Additionally, Justice Traynor indicated that the manufacturer can insure against the risk of injury and
distribute the extra cost of insurance among the public as a cost of doing business by increasing the
price of its products. L (rraynor, J. concurring). However, if any defective products ultimately reach
the market, Justice Traynor reasoned that public policy requires that liability for any resulting injury
be placed upon the manufacturer who is responsible for the product reaching the market, and who
is best situated to afford such protection. l (Traynor, J., concurring).
104. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
105. Greenman, 59 Cal. 2d at 59, 63-64, 377 P.2d at 899, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 699, 701.
106. L
107. Id at 59, 377 P.2d at 899, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 699.
108. I at 60, 377 P.2d at 899, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 699. On appeal plaintiff sought reversal of the
judgment in favor of the retailer only if the judgment against the manufacturer was overturned. IA
109. L at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
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intended to be used."' Once the plaintiff fulfilled this burden, the
product would be deemed unsafe for its intended use and the
manufacturer would be held liable."'
Shortly after the Greenman decision, the American Law
Institute embodied the doctrine of strict liability in the Second
Restatement of Torts. 1 2  Section 402A of the Restatement
provides that liability will be imposed on "one who sells any
product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous" even
though all possible care in the preparation and sale of the product
has been exercised."' The comments to section 402A provide
definitions for the terms "defective condition" and "unreasonably
dangerous. '"" 4  According to comment g, a product is in a
"defective condition" when it is in a condition that has not been
contemplated by the ultimate consumer." 5 Comment i, on the
other hand, defines "unreasonably dangerous" as the condition of
the product when it is "dangerous to an extent beyond that which
would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases
it."" 6 Further, comment j provides that sometimes the product
110. Id at 64, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
111. Id
112. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Opponents of the notion of permitting
state-of-the-art evidence contend that such evidence is irrelevant and inconsistent with section
402A(2)(a) because that section provides that strict liability applies even if the seller has taken all
possible precautions in the preparation and sale of his product. Klein, supra note 18, at 236.
However, the proponents argue that the disallowance of the evidence would render the manufacturer
an insurer, thereby subjecting it to absolute liability, which is not the intended policy of strict
liability. IdE
113. REsTATEmENT (SECOND) Op TORTS § 402A (1965). Butsee Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.,
8 Cal. 3d 121, 133, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 442 (1972) (expressing concern that
section 402A in practice usually leads to the same result that would have been reached under
negligence).
114. See RE TATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comments g & i (1965). See supra note
68 (setting forth the full text of comment g). Comment i provides that for a product to be
unreasonably dangerous, the product sold "must be dangerous to an extent that which would be
ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 402A, comment i (1965).
115. RESTATEaENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A, comment g (1965). See supra note 68 (setting
forth the text of comment g).
116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment i (1965). See supra note 114
(describing the text of comment i). Although "unreasonably dangerous" appears to be very similar
to negligence, Dean Prosser suggests that the unreasonably dangerous requirement was included in
the Restatement definition to prevent products liability from becoming absolute liability, not to make
1826
1992 /Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp.
will be in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous if the
manufacturer fails to give directions, or a warning on the container
of the product, as to the product's proper use.117 While the
California courts initially followed section 402A and its
accompanying comments, they eventually began to look for ways
to escape its rigid confines.1
C. The California Courts Refine The Doctrine of Strict Liability,
and Then Move Away From its Application Toward a Fault-
Based Standard
Today strict products liability appears to be in the midst of a
revolution. 9 In the first decades of its existence, beginning with
Escola and Greenman, the courts extended the boundaries of strict
liability, giving full advantage to plaintiffs. 120 However, by the
products liability negligence-based. Kelso, supra note 82, at 17 (citing Prosser, Strict Liability to the
Consumer in California, 18 HAsTINGS L. 9,23 (1966)).
117. RESTATEENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment j (1965). Comment j states:
j. Directions or warning. In order to prevent the product from being unreasonably
dangerous, the seller may be required to give directions or warning, on the container, as
to its use. The seller may reasonably assume that those with common allergies, as for
example to eggs or strawberries, will be aware of them, and he is not required to warn
against them. Where, however, the product contains an ingredient to which a substantial
number of the population are allergic, and the ingredient is one whose danger is not
generally known, or if known is one which the consumer would reasonably not expect to
find in the product, the seller is required to give warning against it, if he has knowledge,
or by the application of reasonable, developed human skill and foresight should have
knowledge, of the presence of the ingredient and the danger. Likewise in the case of
poisonous drugs, or those unduly dangerous for other reasons, warning as to use may be
required.
Id. Compare Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944)
(Traynor, L, concurring) (laying the foundation for strict liability), and Greenman v. Yuba Power
Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1963) (implementing the
strict products liability theory) with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 402A (1965) (setting forth the
modem strict products liability doctrine).
118. See generally Henderson & Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability: An
Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 U.C.L.A. L REV. 479 (1990) (indicating that there has been
a great shift in the law; by the mid-to late 19 6 0 s, through the expansion of the doctrine of strict
liability, it became increasingly easy for plaintiffs to reach the juries with product defect claims,
however by the early 1980's the courts became reluctant to expand the doctrine to further benefit
plaintiffs).
119. Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 118, at 539; Priest, supra note 54, at 523.
120. Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 118, at 480, 483, 539.
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mid-1980's the courts began placing significant limitations on
plaintiffs' rights, and shifting towards a pro-defendant stance.
121
The following discussion illustrates how the California courts first
modified section 402A of the Restatement in order to fulfill its goal
of easing the plaintiff's burden of proof at trial."n Then, this
Note explains how the courts began its shift away from the
application of strict liability, and moved back toward a fault-based,
or negligence, standard.2
Just seven years after the implementation of section 402A, the
California Supreme Court was reluctant to follow the American
Law Institute's formulation of strict liability. 24 Gradually, the
California courts began refining, and then nibbling away at, the
doctrine of strict liability altogether.125 First, the California
Supreme Court deleted the requirement that plaintiffs prove that the
product was unreasonably dangerous in claims alleging design
defects. 126 To recover under strict liability for design defects a
plaintiff still had to prove that the product was defective in design,
but there was confusion among the courts as to the meaning of the
term "defect."' 27 In alleviating this confusion, the California
Supreme Court took its second step away from the strict liability
doctrine. 12  Particularly, the court established a "risk-benefit"
121. Id. During the 1980's plaintiffs success rates substantially declined. Id at 517. See id. at
525 (suggesting that the courts believe that products liability has gone far enough, and that it is time
to turn things around). Henderson and Eisenberg indicate that failure to warn cases are an exception
to the anti-plaintiff trend. Id at 496. However, they note that the courts may also be becoming more
pro-defendant in this area as well Id The Anderson decision appears to support this notion. See infa
notes 273-314 and accompanying text (detailing the majority's analysis in Anderson).
122. See infra notes 131-167 and accompanying text.
123. See infra notes 168-202 and accompanying text.
124. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 133, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr.
433, 442 (1972); Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 118, at 489.
125. Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 118, at 480.
126. See Cronin, 8 Cal. 3d at 134-35, 501 P.2d at 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 443 (deleting the
unreasonably dangerous requirement for design defect cases based on strict liability) See also Infra
notes 131-148 and accompanying text (discussing the "unreasonably dangerous" component of the
Restatement formulation for strict liability).
127. Kelso, supra note 82, at 18.
128. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 431-32, 573 P.2d 443, 455-56, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 225,237-38 (1978) (formulating a risk-benefit test for design defect cases). See also infra notes
149-167 and accompanying text (indicating the manner in which the California Supreme Court began
to incorporate negligence principles into the doctrine of strict liability).
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test which, in effect, incorporated negligence concepts into the
definition of "defect" as it relates to the design of the product.129
Yet, the court's most notable bite into the doctrine of strict
liability, causing strict liability to slant towards a negligence
standard, was when it articulated a clear exception to strict liability
for unavoidably unsafe products--an exception which generally
applies to prescription drugs. 30
1. California Rejects the "Unreasonably Dangerous"
Requirement in Design Defect Cases
In Cronin v. J.E.B. Olson Corp.,"' the California Supreme
Court faced the question of whether an injured plaintiff seeking
recovery based on the doctrine of strict liability must establish both
that the product was in a defective condition, and that this defective
condition in effect caused the product to be unreasonably
dangerous."' According to Section 402A of the Restatement, an
injured plaintiff must show both.'33 However, in Cronin, the
California Supreme Court rejected the unreasonably dangerous
requirement in design defect cases.T3
In Cronin, the plaintiff was driving a bread delivery truck when
he was involved in a collision.'35 The impact of the collision
broke an aluminum safety clasp which was designed to hold the
bread trays in place.3 6 As a result of the abrupt stop and the
impact of the accident, the loaded trays flew forward and struck the
plaintiff in the back, thrusting him through the windshield of the
truck. 137
129. Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 431-32, 573 P.2d at 455-56, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237-38.
130. See Brown v. Superior Court (Abbot Laboratories), 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1069,751 P.2d 470,
482-83, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412, 424 (1988) (exempting prescription drug manufacturers from strict
products liability). See infra notes 177-202 and accompanying text (discussing the Brown decision).
131. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
132. Cronin, 8 Cal. 3d at 123, 501 P.2d at 1155, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 435.
133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
134. Cronin, 8 Cal. 3d at 134-35, 501 P.2d at 1162-63, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442-43.
135. Id. at 124, 501 P.2d at 1155, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 435.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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The defendant, J.E.B. Olson Corp., alleged that the trial court
erred when it submitted a definition of strict liability to the jury
which failed to include the element that the defective condition of
the product caused it to be unreasonably dangerous."' The
defendant urged that without this element included in the definition
of strict liability, absolute liability would be imposed. 39
In reaching its decision that the trial court did not err, the
California Supreme Court focused on the American Law Institute's
rationale for including the unreasonably dangerous component in
the Restatement definition. 40 Apparently, this component was
added to prevent the seller from becoming an insurer of his
products.141 However, the court noted that requiring the plaintiff
to satisfy the unreasonably dangerous limitation would burden the
plaintiff with proof of an element which "rings of
negligence." 42 In fact, the court asserted that reliance on the
section 402A provision on strict liability in practice usually leads
to the same result that would have been reached under the laws of
negligence. 43 The Cronin court explained that this result, in
essence, would contradict the very purpose of implementing strict
liability in the first place.' 44
Therefore, the Cronin court held that to require a plaintiff to
prove that the defect in the product also made the product
unreasonably dangerous would impose a significantly increased
burden on the plaintiff and would represent "a step backward in
the area pioneered by this court."' 145 The court noted that to
require a plaintiff to prove the product was unreasonably dangerous
would be placing upon the plaintiff a much greater burden than
138. Id. at 127-28, 501 P.2d at 1158, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 438. At the trial the jury returned a
verdict for the plaintiff. Id at 124-25, 501 P.2d at 1156, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 436.
139. Id at 128, 501 P.2d at 1158, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 438.
140. Id at 132, 501 P.2d at 1161, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 441.
141. Id
142. Id
143. Id at 133, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
144. See id. See supra notes 47-91 and accompanying text (detailing the justifications of
establishing strict liability).
145. Cronin, 8 Cal. 3d at 133, 501 P.2d at 1162,104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
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was articulated in Greenman.1" Nevertheless, the decision in
Cronin created confusion among trial court judges regarding how
to define a defective product. 47 The California Supreme Court
tried to resolve this confusion in Barker v. Lull Engineering
Co.. 148
2. The California Supreme Court Advances the "Consumer
Expectation" Test and "Risk-Benefit" Test as the Standard
for Determining Whether a Product is Defective
In Barker, the plaintiff was operating a high-lift loader when
the load he was lifting began to fall. 149 In the process of jumping
out of the loader to avoid the falling material, the plaintiff was
struck by a piece of falling wood and was seriously injured.15
The trial court instructed the jury that, in order to find the
defendant liable for a defect in design, the jury must find that the
product was unreasonably dangerous for its intended use.1
Based on this instruction, the jur found in favor of the
defendant. 152 However, the California Supreme Court reversed
since the "unreasonably dangerous" element of the plaintiff's
burden of proof had been eliminated by Cronin.
153
The main issue left for the California Supreme Court to
determine in Barker was whether the loader used by the plaintiff
was defective."5 The Barker decision attempted to resolve some
146. Id. at 134-35, 501 P.2d at 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 443. See supra notes 103-118 and
accompanying text (discussing Greenman).
147. Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 418, 573 P.2d 443, 446, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225,
228 (1978).
148. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
149. Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 419, 573 P.2d 447, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 229. In Barker, the plaintiff
had only received minimal instruction on how to operate a high-lift loader prior to the day on which
he was assigned to operate the loader. I, While he was lifting a load to the second story of a
building, the load began to tip. IM The workers shouted to plaintiff to jump out of the loader to avoid
the falling lumber. l The plaintiff did so, however, in the process, he was struck by a piece of the
falling wood. Id
150. AL
151. IM at 417, 573 P.2d at 446, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
152. Id.
153. Id
154. 1d&
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of the confusion fostered by the Cronin decision regarding the
def'mition of "defect." '155  In so doing, the Barker court
established a two-prong test.156 The first prong stated that a
product is defective in design "if the plaintiff demonstrates that the
product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would
expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable
manner."' 157 This is what the court termed the "consumer
expectation" test.15 8
However, the Barker court reasoned that the expectations of the
consumer cannot be the sole basis for evaluating design
defectiveness. 9 The court recognized that in many instances the
ordinary consumer would not know what to expect." This is
especially so because consumers have no idea as to how safe the
product could be made. 61 Therefore, the court in Barker adopted
a second standard. 62 The second prong of the two-prong test
provided that a product may also be defective in design if the
plaintiff proves that the product's design proximately caused the
injury, and the defendant fails to show that the benefits of the
design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in the design. 163 The
court then termed this second prong the "risk-benefit"
standard. 16
The Barker court explained that, in order to comply with the
principal purpose underlying the strict liability doctrine, that is, to
relieve an injured plaintiff of many of the burdens inherent in the
laws of negligence and warranty, the burden of proof must shift to
the defendant after the plaintiff shows that the defendant's product
155. Id.
156. Id. at 432, 573 P.2d at 455-56, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237-38.
157. Id at 429-30, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236 (citing CAI. CoM. CODE § 2314
(West 1964)). See id (indicating that this standard is analogous to the Uniform Commercial Code's
warranty of fitness and merchantability).
158. IM. at 430, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
159. Id
160. Id
161. Id.
162. Id
163. Id at 432, 573 P.2d at 456, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
164. Id at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
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proximately caused the plaintiffs injury.'o The defendant would
thus be required to prove that the product is not defective." The
court in Barker asserted that this two-prong standard should lighten
the plaintiff's burden, and therefore comply with the rationale of
the Greenman and Cronin decisions. 6 7 Hence, Barker was
another example of a case in which the courts expanded strict
products liability to favor plaintiffs.
3. Is the "Risk-Benefit" Test a Negligence Test?
Is Barker really a pro-plaintiff holding? Or, does Barker
evidence a shift towards a pro-defendant attitude? It has been
suggested that the risk-benefit test is nothing more than a
negligence test, and nothing more than Section 402A's
unreasonably dangerous test.1 68 According to the Barker court,
this balancing of risks against benefits necessarily incorporates
principles of negligence into strict liability cases, once again
making the plaintiff's case difficult to prove.1" However, the
Barker court purports that this standard is different from negligence
because the defective design test focuses the trier of fact's attention
on the adequacy of the product itself, and not on the
manufacturer's conduct, as in negligence.17 Furthermore, the
court stated that this defective design standard places the burden on
the defendant, whereas in negligence causes of action the burden
remains on the plaintiff. 7'
165. Id
166. Id.
167. Id. at 433, 573 P.2d at 456, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 238. See supra notes 103-148 (discussing
Greenman and Cronin).
168. Kelso, supra, note 82, at 19. See id n.72 (suggesting that the consumer expectation test
may conceptually be merely a different formulation of the same risk-benefit test).
169. Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 434, 573 P.2d at 457, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 239.
170. Id, at 432, 573 P.2d at 456, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 238. But see, Kelso, supra note 82, at 19-20
(purporting that in Barker the focus on the adequacy of the product itself is nominal at best, because
the product exists only because of the manufacturer's conduct). According to Professor Kelso, if the
product does not pass the Barker balancing test, then the manufacturer has negligently placed a
defective product into the marketplace. Id at 20.
171. Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 432, 573 P.2d at 456, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
1833
Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 23
Nevertheless, the Barker court acknowledged that a showing
that a product is defective in design may also often prove that the
manufacturer was negligent in choosing such a design. 72 For
instance, in Barker, the court instructed the jury to consider certain
factors in balancing the risks against the benefits: (1) the gravity of
danger the challenged design posed; (2) the likelihood of that
danger occurring; (3) the possibility of a safer alternative design;
(4) the economic burden of improving the design; and (5) the
chance that any alternative design would cause adverse
consequences to the product and the consumer. 73
These factors appear to be very similar to the factors Judge
Learned Hand articulated in his risk-benefit test for negligence.'74
Even though the court maintained that design defect cases are
analyzed under strict liability,175 the court's analysis may be
interpreted as indicating that products liability is not truly
strict.17
6
4. Forging an Exception to the Doctrine of Strict Liability:
Unavoidably Unsafe Products
The California Supreme Court moved further away from the
doctrine of strict liability, as it was first adopted in Greenman,
when it forged an exception to the doctrine in cases involving
prescription drugs. In articulating this exception, the California
Supreme Court, in Brown v. Superior Court, adopted comment k
of the Restatement of Torts, which exempted manufacturers of
prescription drugs from strict liability.177 In Brown, the court
172. Id. at 434, 573 P.2d at 457, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 239.
173. lad 20 Cal. 3d at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
174. Kelso, supra note 82, at 19 (quoting United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169,
173 (2d Cir. 1947)). Judge Learned Hand stated that three factors must be examined in determining
negligence: (1) the likelihood that the damage will occur, (2) the gravity of the resulting injury; and
(3) the burden of taking sufficient precautions. Id; Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d at 173.
175. Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
176. Kelso, supra note 82, at 22.
177. Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1069, 751 P.2d 470, 482-83, 245 Cal. Rptr.
412,424 (1988); RESTATwENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment k (1965). Comment k reads
as follows:
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refused to apply the consumer expectation and risk-benefit
standards Barker formulated for design defect cases.178 Instead,
Brown exemplifies the California court's trend of moving away
from a pro-plaintiff stance, towards the current orientation of
restricting the ability of plaintiffs to recover in tort for product
related injuries. 179
In Brown, Justice Mosk explained that the social value to be
gained from prescription drugs outweighed the risk of harm caused
by the side effects of those drugs.180 The Brown court relied
extensively on comment k of the Restatement.' 8' Comment k
recognizes that some drugs provide such tremendous benefits to
k. Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products which, in the present state of
human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary
use. These are especially common in the field of drugs. An outstanding example is the
vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very serious
and damaging consequences when it is injected. Since the disease itself invariably leads
to a dreadful death, both the marketing and the use of the vaccine are fully justified,
notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree of risk which they involve. Such a product,
properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warning is not defective, nor
is it unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of many other drugs, vaccines, and the
like, many of which for this very reason cannot legally be sold except to physicians, or
under the prescription of a physician. It is also true in particular of many new or
experimental drugs as to which, because of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient
medical experience there can be no assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of
ingredients, but such experience as there is justifies the marketing and use of the drug
notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk. The seller of such products, again with the
qualification that they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given,
where the situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate
consequences attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the public
with an apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a known, but apparently
reasonable risk.
REsTATEEN-T (SECOND) Op TORTS § 402A, comment k (1965).
178. See Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 53 Cal. 3d 987, 999, 810 P.2d 549,
556, 281 Cal. Rptr. 528, 535.
179. Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 118, at 490-91. According to Henderson & Eisenberg,
the Brown decision was a surprise in that the California Supreme Court broke away from the existing
trend in products liability of imposing liability on drug manufacturers for dangerous designs
regardless of whether adequate warnings of the risks had been furnished. Il at 490. The Brown court
refused to adopt either a "'more generous-to-plaintiffs approach'" for prescription drug liability, or
to adopt a "half-way position" which was embraced in other jurisdictions. IL at 490-491.
180. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1058-59, 751 P.2d at 475, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 416-17.
181. Id at 1069, 751 P.2d at 482-83, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 424.
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society"8 2 that their use is justified, regardless of any unavoidably
high risks that may be involved.'83 Comment k particularly
stresses the importance of marketing and using new or
experimental drugs because of their potential value to society, even
though there can be no assurance of the safety of these drugs since
they have not been in existence long enough to determine whether
they are potentially dangerous.'
In order not to stifle the development of new "wonder drugs,"
comment k provides that the seller of such unavoidably unsafe
products will not be held strictly liable for unfortunate injuries
resulting from their use, so long as the drugs are properly prepared
and accompanied by sufficient directions and warnings.'85
According to comment k, the manufacturer has undertaken to
furnish to the public a useful and desirable product, therefore the
manufacturer should not be held liable for attempting to contribute
to, and improve, society."8 6
In Brown, several plaintiffs filed actions against a number of
drug manufacturers who produced diethylstilbestrol (DES). 8 ' The
plaintiffs claimed that their mothers used DES to prevent
miscarriages, and that this drug was defective.'88 As a result of
their mothers ingesting DES while the plaintiffs were in utero, the
182. An example of one drug which affords great benefits to society is the vaccine for rabies.
RESTATiiMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment k. (1965) See supra note 177 (setting forth the
full text of comment k).
183. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment Ic (1965).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. ld.
187. Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1054, 751 P.2d 470, 473,245 Cal. Rptr. 412,
414 (1988). See, Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 118, at 490-91 (asserting that the California
Supreme Court's decision in Brown to exclude prescription drugs from strict liability was a surprise
since the California courts had been at the forefront in extending the boundaries of products liability
for defective designs); Kelso, supra note 82, at 2 (suggesting that, as a result of the Brown holding,
the time has come to reevaluate the place of products liability in modem tort law); Moore &
Hengesbach, supra note 91, at 54-86 (indicating that the applicability of Brown may be very far-
reaching, and Moore and Hengesbach specifically discuss the application of Brown to over-the-
counter drugs); California Supreme Court Survey, February 1988-April 1988, Torts, 16 PEPPERDINE
L. RE v. 221, 221-28 (analyzing the California Supreme Court's opinion in Brown). See generally,
Comment, Brown v. Superior Court: Drug Manufacturers Get Immunized From Strict Liability For
Design Defects, 19 GoLDEN GATE U.L REV. 435 (criticizing the Brown decision).
188. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1054-55, 751 P.2d at 473, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 414.
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plaintiffs alleged that they sustained injuries."8 9 The plaintiffs
sued under the theories of strict liability, breach of express and
implied warranty, fraud, and negligence."9 The trial court ruled
in favor of defendants after determining that the defendants could
not be held liable for unknown and unknowable side effects of the
drug. 91  The Court of Appeal affirmed.' 92 The California
Supreme Court granted review to examine the issue of strict
liability for manufacturers of prescription drugs which turn out to
be defective. 193
In Brown, the California Supreme Court held that a
manufacturer of prescription drugs is not strictly liable for design
defects, or for injuries caused by dangerous propensities in
prescription drugs, that are scientifically unknowable at the time
they are manufactured. 94 The Brown court reasoned that the
imposition of strict liability for unknowable risks at the time of
manufacture or distribution would discourage manufacturers from
developing new and improved products, for fear that future
significant advances in scientific knowledge would increase their
liability.195 According to the Brown court, it was essential that
prescription drug manufacturers be exempted from strict liability
because such drugs are necessary to relieve pain and suffering and
to sustain life. 196 Unfortunately, it is unavoidable that some users
may be harmed from the use of prescription drugs.197 Thus, the
Brown court interpreted comment k to grant the defendants an
exemption from strict liability, and thereby required the plaintiffs
to prove negligence on the manufacturers' part in order for the
court to hold the defendant liable.' 98
189. IM. The plaintiffs allege that DES was unsafe for use in preventing miscarriages because
the defendants knew that the drug contained a cancer-causing substance, yet they failed to warn users
of this dangerous characteristic. Id.
190. Id at 1055, 751 P.2d at 473, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 414-15.
191. Id
192. Id
193. Id. at 1055-56, 751 P.2d at 473, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 415.
194. Id at 1069, 751 P.2d at 482-83, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 424.
195. Id at 1066, 751 P.2d at 481, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 422.
196. Id at 1063, 751 P.2d at 478, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 420.
197. ld.
198. Id at 1059, 751 P.2d at 476, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 417.
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Nonetheless, scholars, both before and after the Brown decision,
have argued that the potential for harm exists in all products. 99
These scholars asserted that all products should be treated alike,
rather than distinguishing between those that are acceptably
dangerous, such as prescription drugs, and all other produets. °
In fact, one California Court of Appeal interpreted the Brown
holding to apply equally to prescription drugs and other products
in failure to warn cases.2"' However, up until the California
Supreme Court's decision in Anderson v. Owens-Corning
199. Moore & Hengesbach, supra note 91, at 81 n. 154; Kelso, supra note 82, at 26-27 and
accompanying text (referring to Dean Prosser's statements made at the American Law Institute's
meeting convened to furst consider the topic of prescription drugs and Section 402A in 1961).
200. Moore & Hengesbach, supra note 91, at 81 n. 154; Kelso, supra note 82, at 26-27 and
accompanying text (referring to Dean Prosser's statements made at the American Law Institute's
meeting convened to frst consider the topic of prescription drugs and Section 402A in 1961).
201. Vermenlen v. Superior Court, 204 Cal. App. 3d 1192, 1206,251 Cal. Rptr. 805, 813 (1st
Dist. 1988) (disagreed with by Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 217 Cal. App. 3d 772,
266 Cal. Rptr. 204 (2nd Dist. 1990), review gr., in part Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp.,
790 P.2d 238, 269 Cal. Rptr. 74, (1990), and reprinted for tracking pending review Anderson v.
Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 227 Cal. App. 3d 1035 (2nd Dist. 1990) superseded Anderson v.
Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 53 Cal. 3d 987, 810 P.2d 549, 281 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1991)). In
coming to this conclusion, the court in Vermeulen stated that Brown: (1) referred to comment j of
Restatement (Second) Torts § 402A; and (2) asserted that most jurisdictions only impose strict
liability for failure to warn on the manufacturer if it had actual or constructive knowledge at the time
the product was distributed. Id. Brown cited several cases which did not involve prescription drugs.
Id. See, eg., Diamond v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 65 Cal. App. 3d 173, 134 Cal. Rptr. 895 (1976)
(discussing strict liability against the manufacturer of a towmotor); Bojorquez v. House of Toys, Inc.
62 Cal. App. 3d 930, 133 Cal. Rptr. 483 (1976) (addressing the applicability of strict liability against
a retailer and distributor of slingshots); Dosier v. Wilcox-Crittendon Co., 45 Cal. App. 3d 74, 119
Cal. Rptr. 135 (1975) (examining the admissibility of evidence regarding the purchase of a "snap"
or "hook" device, manufactured to be used as a bull tie, stallion chain or cattle tie in a personal
injury action based on strict liability in tort); Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228,
71 Cal. Rptr. 306 (1968) (analyzing strict liability against manufacturer of a defective tire, and against
the supplier and installer of the tire); Oakes v. EI. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 272 Cal. App. 2d
645, 77 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1969) (discussing strict liability against the manufacturer of weed-killing
chemicals that caused a severe systematic skin condition to the plaintiff who was allergic to an
ingredient in the weed-killing spray); Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 46 Cal.
Rptr. 552 (1965) (addressing strict liability against manufacturer and supplier of a fuse and other
supplies used in blasting, and analyzing whether the defendant was negligent for failing to adequately
warn as to the timing of the fuse). Hence, the court in Vermeulen declared that it did not interpret
Brown's holding to be limited to prescription drug cases. Vermeulen, 204 Cal. App. 3d at 1206, 251
Cal. Rptr. at 813. Additionally, the California Supreme Court, in Anderson, stated that although the
holding in Brown only applies to prescription drugs, its logic and common sense are not limited to
drugs. Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 53 Cal. 3d 987, 1000, 810 P.2d 549,556,281
Cal. Rptr. 528, 535. According to Anderson, Brown clearly implied that knowledge is an element of
strict liability for failure to warn cases in cases other than prescription drugs. Id.
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Fiberglass Corp., the California Supreme Court had not extended
Brown into non-drug cases. Indeed, some courts expressly refused
to take this step in failure to warn causes of action concerning
asbestos and asbestos products.2 2
D. The Asbestos Cases
In the past decade the failure to warn doctrine has frequently
been addressed by the courts, particularly because of its use in
asbestos as well as other chemical litigation." 3 In most of these
industrial liability cases, the plaintiffs allege that manufacturers
were aware of the fact that fibers emitted from structural insulation
installed in ships, buildings, or other structures caused asbestosis
and other asbestos related diseases." 4 Hence, much of the
asbestos litigation frequently concerns the point in time at which
asbestos manufacturers and distributors learned, or should have
learned, about the hazards associated with asbestos, thereby
triggering a duty to warn of those hazards.2"'
Generally, a manufacturer must warn of hazards that are
reasonably foreseeable or discoverable.2' Yet, a few courts,
particularly in asbestos litigation, have taken this notion one step
further, and have held that a manufacturer is strictly liable when
the manufacturer sells an unsafe product, whether or not the
manufacturer knew or could have known of the risk of injury
inherent in the product at the time of manufacture.0 7 In effect,
202. See Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 90 NJ. 191, 196,447 A.2d 539, 542 (1982)
(limited by Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 97 NJ. 429, 455, 479 A.2d at 386-88).
203. O'Reilly, supra note 12, at 86 n.5; Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 118, at 484 (noting
that by the mid-1980's failure to warn cases "'blossomed"). See supra notes 1-4 (discussing the
tremendous increase of asbestos litigation during the past decade).
204. See Hensler, Er. AL., supra note 2 (stating that asbestos was used in industrial settings,
in ships, in schools, and in homes across the country, even though there was evidence that
manufacturers knew of the dangers associated with asbestos exposure as far back as the 1930's).
205. Polin, supra note 1, at II; O'Reilly, supra note 12, at 86 n.5.
206. Polin, supra note 1, at 11. See id, (defining reasonably foreseeable or discoverable hazards
as those that a manufacturer knows of or should know of in the course of business).
207. Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod. Co., 90 NJ. 191,204,447 A.2d 539,546 (1982) (imited
to its facts by Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 97 NJ. 429,455,479 A.2d 374,386-88 (1984)). Apparently,
Hawaii, Louisiana, and Missouri also follow the line of cases holding that state-of-the-art evidence
is inadmissible to prove whether manufacturers and distributors of asbestos products knew or should
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this small minority of jurisdictions have prohibited the use of state-
of-the-art evidence.2 8 It is also this minority view that strongly
adheres to the pro-plaintiff ideal of strict liability, whereas the
majority of jurisdictions have returned to the negligence, pro-
defendant, standard.
1. The Use of State-of-the-Art Evidence in Other Jurisdictions
One case prohibiting use of state-of-the-art evidence is Beshada
v. Johns-Manville Products Corp.2' Beshada was a consolidation
of six cases in which all of the plaintiffs were workers, or survivors
of deceased workers, who alleged that they were exposed to
asbestos for varying lengths of time, and as a result of such
exposure they had contracted asbestosis and other asbestos-related
disorders.210 The defendant manufacturers' products did not
contain any warning of their dangerous nature prior to the
1960's.211 At trial, there was a dispute over the defendants'
knowledge of the dangerous condition of their products and over
when they acquired this knowledge.1 2 The defendants argued that
it was not until the 1960's that the hazards associated with asbestos
and products containing asbestos became known.2 3 The plaintiffs
moved to strike the defendants' state-of-the-art defense.1 4 The
trial judge then denied plaintiffs' motion, stating that the
presumption imputing knowledge to the defendants of the dangers
of their products could be overcome by proof that the knowledge
have known of the dangers of asbestos. See supra note 28 (discussing cases which prohibit the use
of state-of-the-art evidence).
208. Il
209. 90 NJ. 191,447 A.2d 539 (1982). Several Hawaii cases involving asbestos have held that
state-of-the-art evidence is irrelevant in actions brought in strict liability. In re Asbestos Cases 829
F.2d 907, 909 (9th Cir. 1987); Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 69 Haw. 287, 740 P.2d 548,
549 (1987); In re Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases, 665 F.Supp. 1454, 1457 (D. Haw. 1986). The trial
court, before trial, granted plaintiffs motion to prevent the defendant from introducing state-of-the-art
evidence based on these Hawaii cases. Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 53 Cal. 3d 987,
992, 810 P.2d 549, 551, 281 Cal. Rptr. 528, 530.
210. Beshada, 90 NJ. at 196, 447 A.2d at 542.
211. Id at 197, 447 A.2d at 542.
212. hI.
213. Id
214. Id at 198, 447 A.2d at 543.
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at issue was unknowable at the time the product was
manufactured.215
However, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the trial
court's holding, and granted the plaintiffs' motion.216 In Beshada,
the court reasoned that knowledge is imputed to the defendant, and
thus it is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove its existence as a
matter of fact.2 7 According to the court in Beshada, culpability
of the manufacturer is irrelevant in strict liability cases, and to
recognize the state-of-the-art defense would amount to imposition
of negligence, rather than strict liability.218 The Beshada court
insisted that in strict liability the only thing that matters is that the
product was unsafe, not that the manufacturer acted
negligently. 219 Further, the court declared that even though the
product was unsafe because of the state of technology at the time
of manufacture, it does not change the fact that the product was
unsafe.220  Therefore, the Beshada court concluded that the
manufacturers must be held strictly liable.221
Hawaii, Louisiana, Missouri, Pennsylvania, and Washington all
agree with Beshada.222 However, a number of jurisdictions still
215. Id. at 199, 447 A.2d at 543.
216. Id.
217. Id at 202,447 A.2d at 545. Freund v. Cellofilm Properies, Inc., 87 NJ. 229,239 (1981)
was cited in Beshada as the leading case in New Jersey law regarding strict liability for failure to
warn. Beshada, 90 NJ. at 202, 447 A.2d at 545.
218. Id, at 204, 447 A.2d at 546. According to Beshada, state-of-the-art is essentially a
negligence defense. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id However, as a result of a great deal of criticism regarding its decision in Beshada, the
Supreme Court of New Jersey later explicitly limited Beshada to its particular facts. See Feldman v.
Lederle Lab., 97 NJ. 429, 455, 479 A.2d 374, 388 (1984). See id at 451-52, 479 A.2d at 386-88
(holding that the duty to warn depends upon the degree of the manufacturers knowledge, and that
the requirements of strict liability failure to warn cases, as provided in Restatement § 402A, comment
j, are substantially similar to that of negligence). However the Feldman court expressly refused to
overrule Beshada. Id at 455, 479 A.2d at 388.
221. Beshada, 90 NJ. at 209,447 A.2d at 549.
222. See, Hawaii Federal Asbestosis Cases, 699 F. Supp. 233 (Haw. 1988); Johnson v.
Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 69 Haw. 287, 740 P.2d 548, 549 (Haw. 1987); In re Hawaii Federal
Asbestos Cases, 665 F. Supp. 1454, 1457 (Haw. 1986) (Hawaiian cases); Halphen v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 788 F. 2d 274,275 (5th Cir. 1986) (Louisiana case); Elmore v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 673
S.W. 2d 434, 438 (Mo. 1984) (Montana case); Carrecter v. Colson Equipment Co. 346 Pa. Super.
95, 499 A.2d 326, 330-31 (Pa. 1985) (Pennsylvania case); Little v. PPG Indus., 579 P.2d 940, 946
(Wash. 1978); Haugen v. Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., 15 Wash. App. 379, 550 P.2d
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have not addressed the issue of whether state-of-the-art evidence is
admissible in failure to warn cases."n Prior to Anderson, the
California Supreme Court was included among the jurisdictions
which had not addressed the issue. 4  Therefore, before
examining the Anderson opinion, it will be helpful to briefly
discuss the views among the California appellate courts preceding
Anderson.
2. State-of-the-Art Evidence in California
Prior to the Anderson decision, the California Courts of Appeal
disagreed on the law in respect to hazards that are unknowable.225
The Court of Appeal for the Second District, in Anderson,226 held
that the state-of-the-art defense, permitting the defendant to show
that the specific risk was not known nor knowable at the time of
manufacture, was not admissible in failure to warn strict liability
cases. 7 However, the Courts of Appeal for the Third District
and the First District held the opposite; that state-of-the-art
evidence is admissible in failure to warn cases.228
71, 76-77 (Wash. 1976) (Washington cases).
223. Klein, supra note 18, at 239, 243-44, 248.
224. Id.
225. Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 53 Cal. 3d 987, 991, 810 P.2d 549, 550,
281 Cal. Rptr. 528, 529. See id at 987, 810 P.2d at 550, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 529 (indicating that
"unknowable" refers to risks that were neither known nor knowable by the application of scientific
knowledge available at the time of manufacture and/or distribution); Polin, supra note 1, at 11-12
(defining "unknowable" as hazards that are not reasonably foreseeable or discoverable).
226. 217 Cal. App. 3d 772, 266 Cal. Rptr. 204 (1990).
227. Anderson, 217 Cal. App. 3d 772, 266 Cal. Rptr. 204, 211 (2nd Dist. 1990), review gr.,
in part Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 790 P.2d 238, 269 Cal. Rptr. 74, (1990), and
reprinted for tracking pending review Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 227 Cal. App.
3d 1035 (2nd Dist. 1990) superseded Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 53 Cal. 3d 987,
810 P.2d 549, 281 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1991)).
228. Vermeulen v. Superior Court, 204 Cal. App. 3d 1192, 1206,251 Cal. Rptr. 805, 813 (1st
Dist. 1988) (disagreed with by Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 217 Cal. App. 3d 772,
266 Cal. Rptr. 204 (2nd Dist. 1990), REviEw GR., in part Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass
Corp., 790 P.2d 238, 269 Cal. Rptr. 74, (1990), and reprinted for tracking pending review Anderson
v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 227 Cal. App. 3d 1035 (2nd Dist. 1990) superseded Anderson
v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 53 Cal. 3d 987, 810 P.2d 549, 281 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1991)); Oakes
v. E.I Du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 272 Cal. App. 2d 645, 646, 77 Cal. Rptr. 709, 713 (1969).
Most jurisdictions agree with the view that state-of-the-art evidence is admissible in failure to warn
eases. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (listing some of the cases and jurisdictions that
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Oakes v. E.L Du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc29 was the first
California case that discussed the state-of-the-art defense in strict
liability actions.23' In Oakes, the defendant manufactured and
distributed weed-killing chemical products. 1  Apparently,
plaintiff Oakes was allergic to an ingredient in the weed killer, and
he acquired a severe systemic skin condition after using the
defendant's products. 2  Oakes proceeded on the theory of strict
liability, however, he failed to allege that defendant knew or should
have known that the weed killer could have an adverse effect on
individuals allergic to the ingredients in the weed killer.
233
According to the court, the plaintiff was required to establish that
the defendant had knowledge of the danger before the defendant
could be held liable.2 34 In Oakes, the court stated that imposing
liability on a manufacturer for failing to warn of unknown and
unknowable defects would cause the manufacturer to be placed in
the role of an insurer, which is beyond any reasonable application
of the rationale for strict liability.2 35 Therefore, the appellate court
affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of the defendant.236
Moreover, in Vermeulen v. Superior Court,"2 7 the court of
appeal for the first district was asked to review pretrial evidentiary
rulings consisting of three general orders which were applicable to
approximately two thousand pending complex asbestos litigation
cases brought under the doctrine of strict liability.238 At issue in
the challenge to all three of these orders was whether the court
follow the majority view).
229. 272 Cal. App. 2d 645, 77 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1969).
230. Anderson, 53 Cal. 3d at 997, 810 P.2d at 555, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 534.
231. Oakes, 272 Cal. App. 2d at 646, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 710.
232. Id
233. Id. at 646-47, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 710-11.
234. Id. at 647, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 710.
235. Id at 650-51, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 713. Many recent cases agree that strict liability was not
intended to make manufacturers and distributors insurers of the safety of the use of their products.
Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 53 Cal. 3d 987, 1004, 810 P.2d 549, 559, 281 Cal.
Rptr. 528, 538; Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 492 N.E.2d 194, 199 (11. 1980); Daly v. General
Motors Corp., 20 Cal.3d 725, 733, 575 P. 2d 1162, 1166, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 384 (1978). See supra
notes 77-91 and accompanying text (discussing the rationale for strict products liability).
236. Oakes, 272 Cal. App. 2d at 652, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
237. 204 Cal. App. 3d 1192,251 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1988).
238. Id at 1195, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 806.
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should permit the use of state-of-the-art evidence."' The
Vermeulen court relied on section 402A, comment j, of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. 24° Comment j provides that
manufacturers will be held strictly liable for failure to warn only
if they have "knowledge, or by the application of reasonable,
developed human skill and foresight should have knowledge," of
the possibility of harm.241"'The court recognized that even though
consideration of state-of-the-art evidence infuses negligence
principles into a cause of action based on strict liability, the theory
of failure to warn "is itself a doctrine borrowed from
negligence. 242
In Vermeulen the court noted that the California Supreme Court
had not settled the issue of whether state-of-the-art evidence is
admissible in other than prescription drug contexts.243
Nonetheless, the Vermeulen court stated that the Brown holding,
which conditioned liability for failure to warn actions on the
manufacturer's knowledge at the time of manufacture or
distribution of the product, was not limited to prescription drug
cases because the Brown court cited several non-prescription drug
cases when reaching its decision.2' Therefore, the Vermeulen
court concluded that state-of-the-art evidence is admissible in strict
liability cases based on failure to warn.24 5
As evidenced by these appellate court decisions, prior to
Anderson there existed a conflict among the California Courts of
Appeal as to whether state-of-the-art evidence is admissible in strict
239. Id. at 1198-1203, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 808-811.
240. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) op TORTs § 402A, commentj (1965). See supra note 117 (listing
the full text of comment j).
241. Vermeulen v. Superior Court, 204 Cal. App. 3d 1192, 1204,251 Cal. Rptr. 805, 812 (Ist
Dist. 1988) (disagreed with by Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 217 Cal. App. 3d 772,
266 Cal. Rptr. 204 (2nd Dist. 1990), REVIEW OR., in part Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass
Corp., 790 P.2d 238, 269 Cal. Rptr. 74, (1990), and reprinted for tracking pending review Anderson
v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 227 Cal. App. 3d 1035 (2nd Dist. 1990) superseded Anderson
v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 53 Cal. 3d 987, 810 P.2d 549, 281 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1991)).
242. IdM at 1204, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 812.
243. Id at 1205, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 813.
244. Id at 1206, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 813. See supra note 201 (listing several cases cited by
Brown which dealt with products other than prescription drugs).
245. Vermeulen, 204 Cal. App. 3d at 1206, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 813.
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liability for failure to warn claims. Until the Anderson decision, the
California Supreme Court had not addressed this issue.
II. THE CASE
In Anderson v. Owens Corning Fiberglass Corp.,24 6 the
California Supreme Court granted review to determine whether a
manufacturer may offer as a defense, in a strict liability failure to
warn cause of action, state-of-the-art evidence to show that the
manufacturer did not know, nor could have known, that the product
was unsafe based on the scientific knowledge available at the time
of manufacture.247 The Anderson court concluded that state-of-
the-art evidence is admissible, thereby permitting negligence
principles to be incorporated into the doctrine of strict liability.
248
In reaching this conclusion the court first illustrated that use of
negligence principles in strict liability claims has survived judicial
challenges in the past which asserted that such incorporation
violates the fundamental principles of strict liability.249 Then, the
Anderson court explained that, regardless of its roots in negligence,
claims alleging failure to warn in strict liability differ significantly
from actions alleging failure to warn in the negligence context.20
Particularly, in negligence failure to warn causes of action, the
plaintiff must prove that the defendants failure to warn was
unreasonable, whereas in strict liability failure to warn the
reasonableness of the defendant's conduct is immaterial."' As a
result, the Anderson court held that a defendant in a strict products
246. 53 Cal. 3d 987, 810 P.2d 549, 281 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1991).
247. Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 53 Cal. 3d 987, 990, 810 P.2d 549, 550,
281 Cal. Rptr. 528, 529 (1991).
248. Id.
249. IL at 1002, 810 P.2d at 558, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 537.
250. Id4 at 1000-03,810 P.2d at 557-59, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 536-38. See infra, notes 292-314 and
accompanying text (justifying the use of negligence principles in strict liability, and comparing the
use of such negligence principles in negligence versus their use in strict liability for failure to warn
causes of action).
251. Anderson, 53 Cal. 3d at 1000-03, 810 P.2d at 557-59, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 536-38. See suprfi
note 70 (discussing the various types of failure to warn causes of action).
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liability action for failure to warn may introduce state-of-the-art
evidence. 52
A. The Facts
Carl Anderson worked as an electrician at the Long Beach
Naval Shipyard from 1941 to 1976.5 The nature of Anderson's
job at the shipyard required him to work in close proximity to
others who were removing and installing insulation products
containing asbestos aboard ships. 4 Anderson alleged that
working in such close proximity to those who were installing and
removing insulation products caused him to be exposed to asbestos
and asbestos products, 1 5 and ultimately caused him to contract
asbestosis and other lung ailments."
Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corporation (hereinafter Owens-
Corning) manufactured products containing asbestos, and these
products were used in the naval shipyard in which Anderson
worked5 7 Anderson claimed that Owens-Corning's products
contained design and manufacturing defects. 8 These products,
Anderson asserted, caused injury to users and consumers, including
himself, while being used in a reasonably foreseeable manner. 9
Anderson also claimed that Owens-Coming marketed its products
with knowledge that exposure to asbestos and asbestos products
was highly likely to cause injury and death.2' Anderson alleged
that this knowledge derived from scientific studies and medical
data.261 Anderson further asserted that while Owens-Coming
knew that consumers and members of the general public did not
252. Anderson, 53 Cal. 3d at 1000-03, 810 P.2d at 557-59, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 536-38.
253. L at 991, 810 P.2d at 550, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 529.
254. Id See supra note 1 (describing the use of asbestos as an insulator).
255. A few of the asbestos products Anderson was exposed to while working at the naval
shipyard were performed blocks, cloth and cloth tape, cement, and floor files. Anderson, 53 Cal. 3d
at 991, 810 P.2d at 550, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 529.
256. Id
257. Id
258. Id
259. Id at 992, 810 P.2d at 550, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 529.
260. Id at 992, 810 P.2d at 551, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 530.
261. Id
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have knowledge of the potential harm asbestos could cause, it
nevertheless failed to warn users of the risk of danger. 2
In response, Owens-Corning asserted the state-of-the-art
defense." 3 Specifically, Owens-Corning insisted that, based on
the state of technology at the time Owens-Corning's products were
distributed, it was not possible for scientific experts to know that
asbestos was hazardous to users in the concentrations associated
with its products.26
The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion to preclude the
defendants from presenting state-of-the-art evidence.265 Then,
without stating a reason, the trial court granted the defendant's
motion to prevent the plaintiff from proceeding on the failure to
warn allegations." Thereafter, the case went to trial on the
design defect theory.267 The jury entered judgment in favor of the
defendant upon finding that the defendant's product contained no
design defects.2  Anderson then moved for a new trial.2
The court granted Anderson's motion for a new trial.27 The
court of appeal for the second district upheld the order, based on
the fact that the trial court erred in precluding Anderson from
proceeding on the failure to warn theory and erred in finding that
the product had no design defectY.27 Additionally, the appellate
court stated that in strict liability asbestos cases, state-of-the-art
evidence is inadmissible because it focuses on the reasonableness
of the defendant's conduct, which is the crux of negligence, and is
therefore irrelevant in strict liability actions.272
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. I&
265. Id The trial court relied on the "'Hawaii cases" in granting the motion. Id The "Hawaii
cases" held that in all types of strict liability causes of action state-of-the-art evidence is irrelevant.
Id. (citing Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhattan Inc., 740 P.2d 548, 549 (Haw. 1987); In re Hawaii
Federal Asbestos Cases, 665 F.Supp. 1454 (Haw. 1986)).
266. Anderson, at 992-93, 810 P.2d at 551, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 530.
267. Id.
268. IM at 993, 810 P.2d at 551, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 530.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id
272. IM.
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B. The Majority Opinion
The California Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice
Panelli,273 affimed the trial and appellate court's grant of a new
trial, and directed that the case be remanded to the trial court for
proceedings consistent with the supreme court's decision in
Anderson.274 In determining whether the negligence elements of
knowledge and knowability should be incorporated into the realm
of strict liability for failure to warn causes of action, the California
Supreme Court had to decide whether to adopt the Vermeulen
decision, which is the majority view, or the appellate court's
decision in Anderson.275 In Vermeulen, the court had held that
state-of-the-art evidence is admissible, whereas the appellate court
in Anderson had decided that the element of the manufacturer's
knowledge, and thus state-of-the-art evidence, is irrelevant in such
cases.
276
The Vermeulen court relied on comment j of the Restatement
in reaching its decision. 7 Comment j suggests that evidence that
a manufacturer knew or should have known of a particular defect
is admissible in strict liability failure to warn cases.278 However,
before the Anderson court decided to embrace the requirements of
comment j, the court first analogized to its decision in Brown v.
Superior Court,279 which held that manufacturers are not to be
found strictly liable for failing to warn of unknown hazards with
273. In Anderson, Justice Broussard filed a concurring opinion, and Justice Mosk filed an
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Id at 1004-09, 810 P.2d at 560-63, 281 Cal. Rptr.
at 539-42 (Broussard, ., concurring, Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
274. Id at 1004, 810 P.2d at 559-60, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 538-39.
275. Id at 991, 810 P.2d at 550, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 529.
276. Id
277. Vermeulenv. Superior Court, 204 Cal. App. 3d 1192, 1206,251 Cal. Rptr. 805, 813 (1st
Dist. 1988) (disagreed with by Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 217 Cal. App. 3d 772,
266 Cal. Rptr. 204 (2nd Dist. 1990), reviewgr., in part Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp.,
790 P.2d 238, 269 Cal. Rptr. 74, (1990), and reprinted for tracking pending review Anderson v.
Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 227 Cal. App. 3d 1035 (2nd Dist. 1990) superseded Anderson v.
Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 53 Cal. 3d 987, 810 P.2d 549, 281 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1991)).
278. Anderson, 53 Cal. 3d at 1000, 810 P.2d at 557, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 536.
279. 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 751 P.2d 470, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1988).
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respect to prescription drugs.2"' Second, the Anderson court
examined the underlying rationale for the strict liability
doctrine.2"' Then, the court analyzed the difference between the
use of negligence components in strict liability failure to warn
cases and their use in failure to warn actions grounded in
negligence. 2
1. The Brown Decision is Extended to All Products Under the
Failure to Warn Cause of Action
In Brown, the California Supreme Court refused to impose strict
liability on manufacturers of prescription drugs where the
manufacturers failed to warn consumers of risks that were
unknowable at the time of distribution.283 The Brown court
reasoned that to impose such liability would discourage
manufacturers from developing new and improved products out of
the fear that later advances in scientific knowledge and technology
would increase their liability. 28 In Anderson, the California
Supreme Court had to determine whether the Brown holding was
applicable beyond the limitations of its narrow factual setting, i.e.,
prescription drugs.285
The majority in Anderson admitted that Brown only applied to
prescription drugs, however the majority decided that "Brown's
logic and common sense are not limited to drugs." 28 6 The
Anderson court interpreted Brown to imply that the element of the
280. Anderson, 53 Cal. 3d at 999, 810 P.2d at 556, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 535; Brown, 44 Cal. 3d
at 1066, 751 P.2d at 481, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 422. See infra notes 283-291 and accompanying text
(discussing the manner in which the Anderson court extends Brown to apply to failure to warn strict
liability cases).
281. Anderson, 53 Cal. 3d at 1000, 810 P.2d at 557,281 Cal. Rptr. at 536. See infra notes 292-
314 and accompanying text (discussing the justifications for infusing negligence concepts in a strict
liability cause of action).
282. Anderson 53 Cal. 3d at 1002-04, 810 P.2d at 558-59, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 537-38. See infra
notes 292-314 and accompanying text (comparing the differences of the use of the failure to warn
theory in negligence causes of action with its use in strict liability litigation).
283. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1066, 751 P.2d at 481, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 422.
284. Id. at 1066, 751 P.2d at 470, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 422.
285. Anderson, 53 Cal. 3d at 1000, 810 P.2d at 556, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 535.
286. 1d
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defendant's knowledge is a necessary component of strict liability
for failure to warn in litigation involving other than prescription
drugs.287 Hence, the court in Anderson was persuaded to accept
the view that knowledge is required in failure to warn strict
liability cases. 288 Alternatively, the court maintained that even if
it was implying too much from the Brown decision, the court was
now squarely faced with the issue of knowability in strict liability
failure to warn causes of action outside the domain of prescription
drugs. 2 9 The Anderson majority decided to adopt the knowledge
requirement, regardless of the fact that doing so would incorporate
negligence principles into strict liability.2" The majority justified
this decision by comparing the doctrine of negligence with that of
strict liability for failure to warn, and noting the similarities in the
doctrines.29
2. Justifying the Application of Negligence Principles
The opponents of the Restatement view, including Anderson,
declared that by requiring the element of knowledge, and thus
allowing the admission of state-of-the-art evidence, the majority
would improperly infuse negligence concepts into strict liability by
focusing on the conduct of the manufacturer or distributor, rather
than on the condition of the product.2' The Anderson majority
rejected this argument, despite recognizing that one of the guiding
principles of strict liability was to relieve a plaintiff of the burdens
of proving negligence.293 In so doing, the majority asserted that
merely because a component of strict liability "rings of" or
287. Id
288. Id
289. Id. at 1000, 810 P.2d at 558, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 536.
290. Id. at 1000, 810 P.2d at 557, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 535.
291. Id. at 1000-03,810 P.2d at 557-59,281 Cal. Rptr. at 536-38. See infra notes 292-314 and
accompanying text (comparing the negligence and strict liability theories in failure to warn cases).
292. Anderson, 53 Cal. 3d at 1000-03, 810 P.2d at 557-59, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 536-38.
293. Id
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"sounds in" negligence does not necessarily mean that it is
precluded from use in the context of strict liability.294
The majority in Anderson then distinguished the condition of
knowledge in strict products liability actions from the knowledge
requirement in negligence cases.295 The majority stated that in a
strict liability suit the jury's focus is directed to the condition of
the product itself, whereas in a negligence case the jury's attention
is focused on the manufacturer's conduct.
296
Further, the majority pointed out that the "warning defect"
theory of strict products liability has stronger roots in negligence
than the manufacturing or design defect theories, because warning
defects involve a failure that is extraneous to the product itself.
297
Hence, according to the majority, the adequacy of a warning given
by a manufacturer cannot be evaluated without reference to the
manufacturer's conduct.298 The majority stated that one cannot
warn of something that is unknowable.' M If such a requirement
were mandated, the manufacturers and distributors would be held
absolutely liable, which is not the purpose of the failure to warn
294. Id. (quoting Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co. 20 Cal. 3d 413,433,573 P.2d 443, 456, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 225,238 (1978)). See also Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725,734,575 P.2d 1162,
1167, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 385 (1978) (concluding that principles of comparative negligence also
apply to actions based on strict products liability). In Daly, the court indicated that strict products
liability and traditional negligence are twin principles. Anderson, 53 Cal. 3d 1001, 810 P.2d at 557,
281 Cal. Rptr. at 536 (quoting Daly, 20 Cal. 3d at 734, 575 P. 2d at 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 380).
But see Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 132, 501 P.2d 1153, 1161-62, 104 Cal. Rptr.
433, 441-42 (1972) (providing that the result of the limitation of section 402A of the Second
Restatement of Torts has both prevented a seller from becoming an insurer of his product, and has
burdened the injured plaintiff with proof of an element which rings of negligence, yet the very
purpose of developing the theory of strict products liability, which was to relieve the plaintiff from
difficulties of proof inherent in pursuing negligence and warranty remedies, is defeated).
295. Anderson, 53 Cal. 3d at 1002, 810 P.2d at 558, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 537. See Klein, supra
note 18, at 235-240 (distinguishing between the admissibility of state-of-the-art evidence in
negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty theories).
296. Anderson, 53 Cal. 3d at 1001, 810 P.2d at 558,281 Cal. Rptr. at 537 (quoting Barker, 20
Cal. 3d at 434, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 239).
297. Id. at 1002, 810 P.2d at 558, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 537.
298. Id.
299. Ild.
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theory of strict liability." ° Therefore, the Anderson majority
rejected the argument that permitting the defendant manufacturer
to present evidence of knowledge, as is permitted in negligence
causes of action, would serve to defeat the purpose of strict
liability.30
1
3. Reasonableness of Manufacturer's Failure to Warn is
Immaterial in Strict Products Liability
The majority in Anderson distinguished between failure to warn
in negligence, and failure to warn in strict liability, in another
respect.3 2 According to the majority, in negligence, a plaintiff is
required to prove that a manufacturer or distributor failed to warn
of a particular risk for reasons which fell below the acceptable
standard of care, that is, what a reasonably prudent manufacturer
should have known and warned about. 3
On the other hand, the majority explained that strict liability
requires a plaintiff to prove only that the defendant failed to
adequately warn of a risk that it either knew or should have known
existed, based on the generally recognized and best prevailing
scientific and medical knowledge available at the time of
manufacture and distribution." 4 The Anderson majority then
explained that while the negligence standard looks to the
reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct in relation to other
manufacturers, the strict liability standard judges the manufacturer's
conduct in light of the knowledge of the scientific community at
the time of manufacture." 5 Therefore, the majority asserted that
300. Id. See id.; Finn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 35 Cal. 3d 691,701, 677 P.2d 1147, 1153, 200
Cal. Rptr. 870, 876 (1984) (noting that if a warning automatically precluded liability in every case,
a manufacturer or distributor could easily avoid liability by providing overly broad warnings, which
would in effect be practically useless). This defeats the purpose of requiring a warning. Id.; Finn, 35
Cal. 3d at 701, 677 P.2d at 1153, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 876.
301. Anderson, 53 Cal. 3d at 987, 810 P.2d at 558, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 537.
302. Id. at 1002-03, 810 P.2d at 558-59, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 537-38.
303. Id at 1002, 810 P.2d at 558, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 537.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 1002, 810 P.2d at 558, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 537.
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the reasonableness of the defendant's failure to warn is
immaterial. °
To more clearly demonstrate the difference between negligence
and strict liability for failure to warn, the Anderson majority
supplied an example.3 7 If a manufacturer tests a product, and the
results of the test are contrary to that of others in the scientific
community and the manufacturer does not warn users and
consumers of the result, the manufacturer may escape liability
under negligence if a reasonably prudent manufacturer would have
decided that the risk of harm was such as not to require a
warning."' However, according to the Anderson majority, such
a manufacturer would not escape liability under the doctrine of
strict liability.3" Strict liability imposes liability upon the
manufacturer if the manufacturer failed to furnish a warning of
dangers that were known to the scientific community at the time
the product was manufactured or distributed, regardless of how a
reasonably prudent manufacturer would have acted.310 Under this
analysis, the manufacturer will be held strictly liable if the trier of
fact determines that, based on the scientific information available
at the time, the manufacturer's failure to warn caused the product
to become unsafe to its intended users.3" Hence, the element of
knowledge is relevant to the imposition of liability under the failure
to warn strict liability theory.1
Accordingly, the Anderson majority declared that a defendant
in a strict products liability action for failure to warn of a risk of
injury may assert the state-of-the-art defense. 3  The majority
306. Id. at 1003, 810 P.2d at 559, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 538.
307. Id,
308. Id.
309. Id,
310. Id. The majority stated that no matter what actions the manufacturer may consider
reasonable, the user of the product must be provided the opportunity to either refrain from using the
product at all, or to use it in a manner that would minimize the degree of danger. Id
311. Id. The majority also indicated that when the risk calls for a true choice judgment, medical
or personal, a warning must be furnished. Id (quoting Davis v. Wyeth Lab., 399 F.2d 121, 129-30
(9th Cir. 1968)). See generally Finn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 35 Cal. 3d 691, 699-700, 677 P.2d 1147,
1152, 200 Cal. Rptr. 870, 874-75 (1984) (listing specific kinds of warnings and their implications).
312. Anderson, 53 Cal. 3d at 1004, 810 P.2d at 559, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 538.
313. Id
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held that the manufacturer may present evidence that a particular
risk was neither known, nor could possibly have been known, by
application of the scientific knowledge available at the time of
manufacture and/or distribution.314
C. Concurring Opinion by Justice Broussard
Justice Broussard agreed with the Anderson majority's
conclusion that state-of-the-art evidence is admissible as a defense
to a suit based on the failure to warn theory of strict products
liability, but wrote separately in order to emphasize that the
majority's opinion was narrow in scope3 t5 Justice Broussard
professed that under the majority's holding, state-of-the-art
evidence may not be admissible in all types of strict liability
cases. 16 For instance, Justice Broussard indicated that such
evidence would not be admissible if a plaintiff proceeded solely on
the "consumer expectation" prong of the design defect principle
propounded in Barker.17  With respect to the consumer
expectation standard in design defect cases, Justice Broussard
asserted that if a product proves to be unsafe, an injured plaintiff
may recover for the resulting injuries based on a warranty theory,
without introducing evidence as to whether the manufacturer knew
or should have known at the time of manufacture or distribution
that the product was defective.1i Since, in this case, Anderson
relied only upon the failure to warn theory, Justice Broussard
314. Id
315. Id at 1005, 810 P.2d at 560, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 539 (Broussard, J. concurring).
316. Id (Broussard, J. concurring).
317. Id (Broussard, J. concurring). See supra, note 157-158 and accompanying text (detailing
the consumer expectation test set forth in Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 429-30, 573 P.2d
443, 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 236 (1978)).
318. Anderson, 53 Cal. 3d at 1005, 810 P.2d at 560, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 539 (Broussard, J.
concurring). This consumer expectation notion, permitting recovery without regard to knowledge on
the part of the manufacturer at the time of manufacture or distribution, has been stated in several
cases. West v. Johnson & Johnson Prod., Inc., 174 Cal. App. 3d 831, 852-58, 863-67, 220 Cal. Rptr.
437, 448-52, 456-58 (1987); Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 740 P.2d 548, 549 (Haw. 1987);
Ontai v. Straub Clinic and Hosp. Inc., 66 Haw. 237, 659 P.2d 734, 744-45 (1983).
1854
1992 /Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp.
concluded that the state-of-the-art evidence was properly
admitted.319
D. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Justice Mosk
Justice Mosk agreed with the Anderson majority insofar as the
majority affirmed the granting of a new trial ordered by the
appellate court.32 However, Justice Mosk, the author of the
opinion in Brown,321 argued that the majority in Anderson, which
relied extensively on Brown, failed to recognize that Brown was
based on a narrow exception to strict products liability applicable
only to prescription drugs.32
Justice Mosk asserted that in Brown the court recognized a
significant distinction between prescription drugs and other
products.3' Justice Mosk stated that since prescription drugs are
manufactured in order to save lives and reduce pain, public policy
encourages the development and marketing of new drugs, even if
some risks might result.32' Therefore, Justice Mosk asserted that
the majority stretched the holding in Brown beyond all recognition
by relying on it in cases involving products other than prescription
drugs.3" Justice Mosk asserted that use of Brown in this manner
makes its narrow exception swallow up fundamental law.
326
Moreover, Justice Mosk suggested that the court should
consider the idea of either determining failure to warn actions
solely on a negligence theory, or drawing a bright-line rule that
could be applied to all failure to warn strict liability actions.327
Justice Mosk stated that this bright-line rule should provide for a
319. Anderson, 53 Cal. 3d at 1005, 810 P.2d at 560-61,281 Cal. Rptr. at 539-40 (Broussard,
J., concurring).
320. Id at 1005, 810 P.2d at 561,281 Cal. Rptr. at 540 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
321. See supra notes 177-202 and accompanying text (describing the Brown holding).
322. Anderson, 53 Cal. 3d at 1008,810 P.2d at 562,281 Cal. Rptr. at 541 (Mosk. J. concurring
and dissenting).
323. Id (Mosk, L, concurring and dissenting).
324. Id (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d
1049, 1063, 751 P.2d 470, 479, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412, 420 (1988)).
325. Id (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
326. id (Mosk, I., concurring and dissenting).
327. Id at 1008, 810 P.2d at 563,281 Cal. Rptr. at 542 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
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clear distinction between situations where the defendants actually
knew of the dangers, and situations where the defendants should
have known of the dangers.328 In the first instance, Justice Mosk
asserted that state-of-the-art evidence should not be admissible,
whereas in the latter it should be admissible.3"' Particularly,
Justice Mosk suggested that, at trial, if plaintiffs can prove that the
defendant manufacturers had actual knowledge of the high risks of
injury from the use of their products, then state-of-the-art evidence
would be excludable by the trial court as irrelevant.330 However,
Justice Mosk explained that if the plaintiffs are only capable of
establishing that, based on the scientific knowledge available at the
time of manufacture and distribution, the defendant manufacturers
should have known of the dangerous characteristic of their
products, then state-of-the-art evidence would be admissible if
presented by the defendant manufacturers.331
Thus, Justice Mosk stated that he would affirm the order of a
new trial granted by the trial court and upheld by the court of
appeal.332 Additionally, Justice Mosk suggested that at the new
trial, the court should either apply the doctrine of negligence alone,
or the bright-line rule set forth above.333 Accordingly, Justice
Mosk concluded that upon application of the bright-line rule, the
court should find, as did the appellate court in Anderson, that state-
of-the-art evidence is inadmissible in Anderson since Anderson, the
plaintiff, had shown that Owens-Coming knew, at the time of
manufacture and distribution, that its products could cause
asbetosis. 31
328. Id at 1008-09, 810 P.2d at 563, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 542 (Mosk, ., concurring and
dissenting). See CarrizosaJusticesAllow 'State-of-Art"'Product Defense; Distincton BlurredBetween
Negligence and Strict Liability; Asbestos Case Ruling, LA. Daily ., May 31, 1991, at 5, col. 2-3
(summarizing both the majority and Justice Mosk's dissenting opinions in Anderson).
329. Anderson, 53 Cal. 3d at 1008-09, 810 P.2d at 563, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 542 (Mosk, J.
concurring and dissenting).
330. Id (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Mosk indicated that defendant
manufacturers would still be able to produce evidence to show that they did not have any prior
knowledge, as the plaintiffs claim. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
331. Id (Mosk, 3., concurring and dissenting).
332. Id (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
333. Id (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
334. Id (Mosk, 3., concurring and dissenting).
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Ill. LEGAL RAMIICATIONS
The decision in Anderson settled a dispute among the California
appellate courts by concluding that state-of-the-art evidence is
admissible in failure to warn strict liability cases."' By allowing
the defendant to present evidence showing that the alleged hazards
of the product were unknowable at the time of manufacture and
distribution, the court, in effect, funneled failure to warn actions
back into the realm of negligence. 336 Therefore, the Anderson
decision impacts both the traditional distinction drawn between
strict liability and negligence, and the application of the strict
liability doctrine outside the realm of failure to warn.
A. Anderson Blurs the Distinction Between Negligence and Strict
Liability
Apparently, most of the courts which prohibit the use of state-
of-the-art evidence do so in order to maintain a conceptual
distinction between the negligence and strict liability theories in
failure to warn cases. 3 ' By permitting state-of-the-art evidence
to be presented by the defendant in a strict liability failure to warn
cause of action, the majority in Anderson blurred this
distinction.138 Particularly, the majority relied on a fault-based
standard for a no-fault cause of action, thereby abrogating the
original purpose of the strict liability doctrine. 339
335. Anderson, 53 Cal. 3d at 1004, 810 P.2d at 559, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 538.
336. See Carrizosa, supra note 328, at 1, col. 6 (providing that the court in Anderson now has
made a strict liability trial into a negligence trial).
337. Klein, supra note 18, at 239. These courts hold that state-of-the art evidence is irrelevant
to any theory of strict liability. See supra note 28 (listing several cases which prohibited the use of
state-of-the-art evidence).
338. Carrizosa, supra note 328, at 1, col. 6. See infra notes 340-378 and accompanying text
(explaining how the majority's reliance on a fault-based standard abrogated the original purpose of
strict liability).
339. Id
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1. The Majority Relied on a Fault-Based Standard for a No-
Fault Cause of Action
Originally, true strict liability was a no-fault doctrine.
3 40
Simply, if the product was defective when it was manufactured or
distributed, and the product was thereafter placed on the market,
the manufacturer was held strictly liable for any injury caused by
the product. Liability arose regardless of whether the manufacturer
had knowledge of the defect, so long as the product was being used
according to the instructions (or--for its intended purpose). 34'
Typically, a court would only consider a defendant's knowledge in
negligence causes of action. 2 Nevertheless, the California
Supreme Court in Anderson clearly stated that evidence as to the
defendant's knowledge, or knowability, of risks inherent in its
product is admissible in both negligence and strict liability
cases."3 Hence, the majority resorted to a fault-based standard
for a no-fault cause of action.' The Anderson court reached this
decision upon finding that the failure to warn theory itself is
grounded in negligence.34 s
340. True strict liability was expounded in Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod, Inc., and adhered
to by the appellate court in Anderson. See Anderson, 53 Cal. 3d 987, 991,810 P.2d 549, 550, 281
Cal. Rptr. 528, 529; Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 377 P.2d 897, 900,27 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 700 (1963); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440
(1944) (Traynor, 3., concurring).
341. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 377 P.2d 897, 900,27 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 700 (1963); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440
(1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
342. Fscola, 24 Cal. 2d at 462, 150 P.2d at 440 (Traynor, 3., concurring).
343. Anderson, 53 Cal. 3d at 1004, 810 P.2d at 559, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 538. See supra notes
273-314 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's analysis of the applicability of the state-of-
the-art defense).
344. Anderson, 53 Cal. 3d at 1004, 810 P.2d at 559, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 538.
345. See supra notes 297-301 and aecompanying text (explaining the Anderson majority's idea
that the failure to warn theory is rooted in negligence).
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2. The Majority's Use of this No-Fault Standard Contradicts
the Original Rationale for Implementing the Theory of
Strict Liability
Since the majority justified its decision by stating that the
failure to warn theory of strict liability is grounded in negligence,
it has been argued that the court's opinion flatly contradicts the
rationale for implementing strict products liability34 6 Again, strict
liability was primarily adopted to relieve an injured plaintiff from
the burdens inherent in proving the fact that the manufacturer's
conduct amounted to negligence.347  Additionally, since
manufacturers are in a better position to bear the costs of the injury
than the innocent plaintiff, public policy mandated that
manufacturers should be strictly liable for such injuries. 4 Thus,
by incorporating the negligence component of knowability into the
realm of strict liability, the Anderson decision makes it more
difficult to recover than under the traditional strict liability rule.
Since defendant manufacturer's will now have an extra element
to prove (the fact that they did not know, nor could have known,
of the products dangerous propensity at the time of manufacture
and distribution), the Anderson decision will also tend to cause
trials to last longer, thereby discouraging plaintiff's from bringing
suit because the increased length of the trial will cause the cost of
such litigation to increase. 4 Moreover, prior to Anderson, the
imposition on the manufacturers of the costs of failing to discover
potential hazards, created an incentive for them to conduct
extensive safety research. Now, by allowing the defendant
manufacturers to introduce state-of-the-art evidence, the Anderson
346. See Rosen, Unknowable Hazards-Loophole forAsbestos Makers isa Threat to Workers,
L.A. Daily J., June 28, 1991, at.6, col. 3. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text (detailing
the four main justifications for imposing strict liability on manufacturers).
347. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text (stating that the doctrine of negligence
imposed great burdens on plaintiffs).
348. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text; Rosen supra note 346, at 6, col. 5
(explaining that the manufacturer is in the best position to be held liable for injuries proximately
caused by its products).
349. Rosen, Supra note 346, at 6, cal. 3.
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decision may have the effect of discouraging manufacturers from
researching and developing new and more safe products."'
a. The Anderson Decision Imposes the Difficulties Inherent in
Negligence into Strict Liability
Under Anderson, an injured plaintiff is no longer relieved of the
difficulties inherent in proving that a manufacturer acted
negligently. 51 Particularly, Anderson requires the plaintiff to
prove that the defendant knew, or should have known, that the
product was unsafe, yet the defendant failed to warn of its
hazards.3 52 This requirement forces the plaintiff to focus on the
manufacturer's conduct, regardless of the fact that strict liability
was intended to remove this burden from the plaintiff.
353
Traditionally, in true strict liability, the court needed only focus on
the condition of the product, whereas in negligence, the court was
directed to the conduct of the manufacturer or distributer.354
Nonetheless, the Anderson court attempted to justify requiring
the plaintiff to focus on the manufacturer's conduct by declaring
that warning labels are not actually a part of the product.
355
Therefore, the Anderson court stated that the adequacy of the
warning, or the reasons for failing to furnish a warning, cannot be
determined without examining the manufacturer's conduct. 56
However, is it not possible that the warning label may actually be
a part of the product?
Comment j of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 402A,
which governs defective warning actions, provides that sometimes
350. M, at p.6 , col. 4.
351. Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 53 Cal. 3d 987, 1004, 810 P.2d 549,559,
281 Cal. Rptr. 528, 538 (1991).
352. Id
353. See supra notes 340-342 and accompanying text (indicating that under true strict liability,
the manufacturer's knowledge, or knowability, as to the product's risks is irrelevant).
354. Anderson, 53 Cal. 3d at 1001-02, 810 P.2d at 558, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 537 (quoting Barker
v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 434, 573 P.2d 443, 457, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 239 (1978)).
355. Id at 1002, 810 P.2d at 558, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 537.
356. Id at 1002, 810 P.2d at 558,281 Cal. Rptr. at 537 (quoting Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20
Cal. 3d 413, 434, 573 P.2d 443, 457, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 239 (1978)).
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a seller is required to place a warning, or furnish directions, on the
container itself in order to ensure the safety of the product.1
7
Can this be interpreted as suggesting that some products are
incomplete without a warning, or directions as to their use, and
therefore suggesting that the warning is a necessary part of the
product? If so, then the Anderson court might not have been able
to properly justify the admissibility of evidence as to the
defendant's knowledge at the time of manufacture. For instance, if
the warning was deemed part of the product, then the majority in
Anderson was actually looking to the character of the product.
Thus, the court would not have had any justification for focusing
on the manufacturer's conduct. However, if the warning was
deemed part of the product, yet the court still looked to the
manufacturer's conduct, then the Anderson court was actually using
negligence principles instead of strict liability standards. The court
in Anderson apparently did not contemplate this possibility.
b. Is the Majority's Distinction Between Strict Liability and
Negligence Well Founded?
Another question that must be asked is whether there is a real
distinction, as the court in Anderson contended, between the focus
on the manufacturer's conduct in negligence, versus the focus on
the condition of the product in strict liability. The court explained
that, in negligence actions, a manufacturer may escape liability for
failure to warn if other manufacturers of similar intelligence would
also not have warned of the hazard.3"8 However, the court
asserted that in strict liability litigation, if the dangers were known
to the scientific community at the time of production or
distribution, the manufacturer may be held strictly liable for failing
to warn of such risks.3 Thus, in strict liability whether or not
other manufacturers of similar intelligence would have warned of
357. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A, comment j (1965). See supra note 117
(setting forth the full text of comment J).
358. Anderson, 53 Cal. 3d at 1003, 810 P.2d at 559, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 538.
359. l
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the hazard is irrelevant.36 As long as the scientific community
knew that the manufacturer's product was inherently dangerous, the
manufacturer will be held strictly liable for the resulting harm. 61
However, the Anderson court did not clarify what was meant
by dangers "known to the scientific community" at the time of
manufacture or distribution. 2 For instance, will the hazard be
deemed to be known to the scientific community if one
manufacturer conducts a single test and determines that the product
is defective, yet the other manufacturers of the same type of
product conduct their own tests and the results of these tests
indicate that the product is safe? Can the result of one test be
sufficient to impute knowledge of the risk to the scientific
community, thereby subjecting all manufacturers who failed to
warn of that risk to liability? Or, can manufacturers ignore the one
test result since all other tests found the product to be risk free?
This scenario was not addressed by the court in Anderson. The
Anderson decision, therefore, provides no workable definition of
"scientific community," nor does it specify the responsibilities
placed on manufacturers once their product's dangers are
scientifically knowable.
Further, the Anderson court did not clarify what was meant by
an "inherently dangerous," or "unsafe" product.363 For instance,
will a product be deemed unsafe only if it causes an injury? Will
it be considered unsafe and inherently dangerous if it merely has
the potential of causing harm? Or, is the product unsafe only when
it is "unreasonably unsafe?" Again, the Anderson court did not
define these terms.
360. IM.
361. Id.
362. ld. The court in Anderson did not define the term "known to the scientific community."
l
363. 1d.
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c. The Holding in Anderson Will Cause Trials to Last Longer
and Will Therefore Increase the Cost of Recovery
The third manner in which Anderson undermines the traditional
doctrine of strict liability is that the Anderson decision will cause
longer trials and increase the cost of recovery, thereby (or, once
again) restricting the plaintiff's ability to recover.3"' After
Anderson, manufacturers may try to "muddy the waters" at trial
by trying to prove that not even the scientific community could
possibly have known of their products' dangers at the time the
products were made.365 By adding this extra element of proof,
each party will be forced to bring into court experts to testify
whether or not such hazards were scientifically knowable at the
time of manufacture." As a result of hearing this expert
testimony, the duration of the trial will increase, as well as the cost
of the trial, since the parties will most likely have to pay the
experts to testify. Further, the increase in the length of the trial will
cause the attorney fees to rise proportionally, and add to the
existing backlogs in most court systems.
ad Anderson Will Discourage Manufacturers from Designing
and Manufacturing Safer Products
Finally, opinions differ as to the result of the abrogation of true
strict liability for failure to warn cases. Some believe that the
abolishment of true strict liability in failure to warn causes of
action will result in the decrease of research related to improving
the quality and safety of products.367 Others believe the opposite,
that holding manufacturers exempt from strictly liable will actually
364. See Rosen, supra note 346, at 6, col. 3 (suggesting that the Anderson decision will cause
the length of an asbestos trial to increase, and thereby cause the cost of litigation to increase as well).
365. Rosen, supra note 346, at 6, col. 5.
366. Ia at 6, col. 3.
367. Rosen, supra note 346, at 6, col. 3-4.
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encourage manufacturers to conduct more thorough research, and
therefore increase product safety."
For example, at least one commentator, David Rosen,
369
asserts that the Anderson decision will discourage manufacturers
from manufacturing safer products.37 Particularly, he contends
that, prior to Anderson, traditional strict liability standards held the
manufacturers liable for the costs of their failure to discover
dangers inherent in their products.371 Therefore, according to Mr.
Rosen, the fear of liability acted as a great incentive for
manufacturers to invest significant amounts of money and time in
conducting safety research.3' However, Mr. Rosen states that,
since Anderson only imposes liability on manufacturers for hazards
that were scientifically knowable at the time of manufacture and
distribution, manufacturers will tend to trim back on basic safety
research expenditures."
Accordingly, Mr. Rosen alleges that, under Anderson,
manufacturers will merely need to determine whether their product
contains risks which are known in the scientific community to
cause harm, and then warn the consumers of these risks.374 Thus,
manufacturers will no longer need to worry about protecting
themselves from liability for dangers in their product which may
manifest at some future date.375 Consequently, Mr. Rosen
368. Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1063,751 P.2d 470, 478-79, 245 Cal. Rptr.
412, 420 (1988). See Moore & Hengesbach, supra note 91, at 74 (suggesting that Brown should be
extended to all products with respect to its policy of encouraging research and development by
exempting prescription drugs from strict liability, thus asserting that all products should be treated
alike); Carrizosa, supra note 328, at I, col. 6, at 5, col. I (suggesting that the Anderson ruling will
enable manufacturers to take risks, by conducting research to improve their products, which they
could not have taken prior to Anderson without having to constantly worry about being penalized,
years later, for knowledge they might acquire after placing the product on the market).
359. David Rosen, who represented the California Trial Lawyers Association as an amicus in
Anderson, is a partner with Rose, Klein & Marias, a Los Angeles law firm. See Carrizosa, supra note
328, at 1, col.6 (indicating that Mr. Rosen took part as an amicus in Anderson). Mr. Rosen also
writes occasionally for the Los Angeles Daily Journal. See Rosen, supra note 346 at 6, col. 3.
370. Rosen, supra note 346 at 6, col. 3-4.
371. Id. at 6, col. 4.
372. Id at 6, col. 3.
373. Id
374. Id at 6, col. 3-4.
375. Id at 6, col. 4.
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maintains that the potential decrease in research may cause a
proportional reduction in product safety.376
On the other hand, in Brown v. Superior Court, which
concerned defectively designed prescription drugs, the court
implied the exact opposite, that the imposition of strict liability
would discourage manufacturers from conducting research, and
developing new and safer products, for fear that later developments
in scientific knowledge would increase their liability.377 As a
result, it has been argued that all new products should be exempted
from strict liability, as are prescription drugs.378 Nonetheless,
Anderson did not do away with the doctrine of strict liability
altogether. 79  Two questions remain: (1) is strict liability
applicable beyond the realm of failure to warn allegations?, and (2)
should Brown be extended to exempt all defectively designed
products from strict liability?
B. What's in Store for Strict Liability?
One of the biggest puzzles remaining after Anderson is whether
any form of strict liability remains for either failure to warn, as in
Anderson, or defective design, as in Brown."' Justice Broussard,
in a concurring opinion in Anderson, said that the majority opinion
in Anderson should be limited to failure to warn cases, and thus not
be applicable to manufacture or design defects."' However,
Justice Panelli, who authored the majority opinion, made no such
376. Id
377. Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1063,751 P.2d 470,479,245 Cal. Rptr. 412,
420 (1988).
378. See Moore & Hengesbach, supra note 91, at 74.
379. Traditional strict liability is still used in design defect cases (excluding prescription drug,
and unavoidably unsafe product cases), as well as in manufacturing defect cases. See Barker v. Lull
Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 426-27, 573 P.2d 443, 452, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 234 (1978) (detailing the
two-part test used in analyzing design defect cases).
380. Moore & Hengesbach, supra note 91, at 57-58 & n.68.
381. Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 53 Cal. 3d 987, 1004-05, 810 P.2d 549,
560, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 539 (1991) (Broussard, J., concurring). See supra notes 315-319 and
accompanying text (detailing Justice Broussard's concurring opinion in Anderson).
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concession." 2 Therefore, Anderson might possibly be stretched
to cover other strict liability cases as well.
1. Should the Brown Decision Be Extended to Apply Beyond
the Realm of Prescription Drugs?
The question then arises that if Anderson is extended, should
Brown also be extended to apply to all types of defectively
designed products?. 3  Prior to Anderson, California courts
consistently rejected arguments advocating the extension of Brown
and comment k to non-drug products where such products are not
"unavoidably unsafe," because such products were not as socially
important as prescription drugs." 4 Although Anderson relied
extensively on Brown, the opinion did not expressly hold that
Brown should be extended beyond prescription drug cases.385
Rather, Anderson acknowledged the fact that Brown applies only
to prescription drugs, yet stated that its rationale may be applicable
in other contexts.8 6
Interestingly, Justice Mosk, who wrote the majority decision in
Brown, asserted in his dissent in Anderson, that the Anderson
majority stretched the holding and analysis of Brown beyond its
scope when the majority relied on Brown in cases involving other
than prescription drugs. 7 In Brown, Justice Mosk emphasized
that the court was creating a narrow public policy exception for
prescription drugs because of their social utility and the public
382. Carrizosa, supra note 328, at 5, col. 3.
383. See Moore & Hengesbach, supra note 91, at 57 & n.65 (indicating that comment j, which
governs failure to warn for strict liability cases, contains the same elements of foresceability and
reasonable conduct as does comment k, which governs strict liability for design defects, and which
is, in fact, an articulation of a negligence standard).
384. Moore & Hengesbach, supra note 91, at 55-56 n.62, 81 n.154-56. But see supra note 368
and accompanying text (suggesting that all products should be treated alike).
385. Anderson, 53 Cal. 3d at 1000, 810 P.2d at 556, 281 Cal. 3d at 535.
386. Id,
387. Id at 1008,810 P.2d at 562,281 Cal. Rptr. at 541 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
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interest in their development.388 However, in Anderson, the
majority downplayed this distinctions.3 9 Therefore, Justice Mosk
insisted that the Anderson majority allowed the exception to defeat
the rule. 90
Nevertheless, many scholars ignore Justice Mosk's
contentions.39' Instead, these scholars maintain that there really
is not, and never has been, any difference between the negligence
and the strict liability causes of action. 392 Particularly, these noted
commentators suggest that none of the four main reasons for
adopting strict liability actually support the conclusion that strict
products liability is essential, and that it will cause a different
result than under the theories of negligence or breach of
warranty.
393
First, these commentators insist that the difficulty in proving a
manufacturer's negligence was not a substantial concern to a
plaintiff.3  Instead, the scholars contend that the essential
concern was whether the plaintiff should be able to recover when
no one, not even the manufacturer was at fault.395 Second, these
noted commentators state that the public policy of encouraging
manufacturers to produce safer products is not furthered by
imposing strict liability on the manufacturer since the manufacturer
has already taken all reasonable steps in producing the product.
396
388. Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1063, 751 P.2d 479, 245 Cal. Rptr. 420 (1988);
Kelso, supra note 82, at 24-25; Carrizosa, supra note 328, at 1, col.6. See, e.g., yyyyln re Hawaii
Federal Asbestos Cases, 665 F. Supp. 1454, 1459 (1986) (providing that the courts only apply
comment k to prescription drugs, thus Brown, 182 Cal. App 3d 1125, 227 Cal. Rptr. 768, does not
apply to asbestos products at all).
389. Anderson, 53 Cal. 3d at 1000, 810 P.2d at 557, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 536; Kelso, supra note
82, at 24-25; Carrizosa, supra note 328, at 1, col. 6.
390. Anderson, 53 Cal. 3d at 1008, 810 P.2d at 562, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 541 (Mosk, J.,
concurring); Kelso, supra note 82, at 24-25; Carrizosa, supra note 328, at 1, coL 6.
391. See Kelso, supra note 82, at 1; Polin, supra note 70, at 559; KEETON Lr" AL., supra note
55, at 697 (providing that there really is no difference between negligence and strict liability causes
of action).
392. Kelso, supra note 82, at 1; Polin, supra note 70, at 559; KErTON Er AL., supra note 55,
at 697.
393. Kelso, supra note 82, at 5-10; Prosser, supra note 83, at 799-800; Prosser, supra note 98,
at 1116-19.
394. Kelso, supra note 82, at 8; Prosser, supra note 96, at 1116-17.
395. Kelso, supra note 82, at 8; Prosser, supra note 96, at 1116-17.
396. Kelso, supra note 82, at 8; Prosser, supra note 96, at 1119.
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Third, these scholars contend that the expectations of consumers
are sufficiently protected through the theories of breach of
warranty, thus strict liability is not necessary for this purpose. 97
Finally, these scholars disagree with the notion of holding
manufacturers strictly liable merely because they are in the best
position to insure against the cost of the injuries caused by their
products.398 Instead, they argue that no court has ever fully
accepted the policy favoring risk-spreading since no court has gone
as far as imposing absolute liability on the manufacturer."'
Along the same lines, these scholars assert that there is no easy
way to distinguish between prescription drugs, over-the-counter
drugs, and all other products, as Justice Mosk did in Brown.4"o
Therefore, these scholars suggest that Brown should be extended to
apply to all products liability cases."°
CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court, in Anderson v. Owens-Coming
Fiberglass Corp., restricted the applicability of the doctrine of strict
products liability by permitting a defendant to offer evidence that
the defendant had no way of knowing of the danger of its product,
thereby incorporating negligence principles into the realm of strict
products liability.' As a result, injured plaintiffs will no longer
be relieved of the burdens inherent in proving that the
manufacturer's conduct amounted to negligence, although relief
397. Kelso, supra note 82, at 8-9.
398. Id. at 9.
399. Id, Several cases have reiterated the statement that "manufacturers are not insurers of their
products." Anderson v. Owens-Coming, 53 Cal. 3d 987,994,810 P.2d 549,552,281 Cal. Rptr. 528,
531 (1991); Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1066,751 P.2d 470,480-81,245 Cal. Rptr.
412, 422 (1988); Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 402 N.E. 2d 194, 199 (11. 1980); Daly v. General
Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 733, 575 P.2d 1162, 1166, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 384 (1978).
400. Kelso, supra note 82, at 28 (citing Prosser's observations during the American Law
Institute's (A.L.) proceedings, when Section 402A of the Restatement Second was fast being
considered by the A.L.L, 38 A.L.. PRoc. 55 (1962)).
401. Kelso, supra note 82, at 28 (citing Prosser's observations during the A.L.I. proceedings,
when Section 402A of the Restatement Second was first being considered by the A.LI., 38 A.LI.
PRoc. 55 (1962)).
402. See supra notes 273-314 and accompanying text (discussing the majorities decision in
Anderson).
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from this burden was one of the primary purposes for imposing
strict liability. .Whether or not all products will eventually be
exempted from strict liability, the final result is that Anderson
reinforces the current trend in product liability law in favor of
extending protection to defendants. This so called "quiet
revolution"' 3 in products liability appears to be bringing
products liability, full circle, back to a fault-based negligence
standard.
Dana K Astrachan
1869
403. See Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 119, at 539 (defining the significant changes that
have recently occurred in the law of products liability as a "quiet revolution-).

